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The Effects of Carbon Pricing and related Policy 
Uncertainty on the Australian Electricity Sector 
Liangxu Zhu 
ABSTRACT 
Climate change has drawn increasing attentions in recent years due to its impact on the 
global environmental system. It motivated policy interventions around the world to 
constrain emissions of Greenhouse Gases (GHG), which has been scientifically proved 
to be the cause of this phenomenon. In July 2012, the Australian government introduced 
Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) as national climate change mitigation policy. This 
thesis studies the effects of carbon pricing and related policy uncertainty on Australian 
electricity sector. 
The study firstly evaluates the effect of CPM implementation on both spot market and 
derivative market for electricity. Changes in electricity prices and volatility level that 
can be attributed to carbon pricing are assessed. By distinguishing between the 
exchange-traded (ETD) and over-the-counter (OTC) contracts, it further investigates 
the response to the CPM implementation in two segments of electricity derivative 
market. Besides price transition, changes in other market characteristics such as 
turnover, liquidity and speculation are also reviewed. Since carbon costs were included 
in the ETD contracts, whereas it was not the case for the OTC contracts, an implied 
carbon price is derived to reflect the market expectation of carbon price. It is further 
linked with the S&P/ASX 200 Utilities (AXUJ) index of Australian Stock Exchange to 
test whether expectation of carbon price in electricity derivative market influenced the 
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stock price variability of electricity companies. During the CPM implementation, 
policy uncertainty arose as a result of political controversies. Hence, a laboratory 
experiment is designed to look into the effect of policy uncertainty on emitters’ 
decisions in production and abatement investment. In the experiment, players act as 
independent emitters, whose production activities generate revenue and release 
emissions, which in turn induce compliance costs under the regulation. However, 
emitters could reduce their compliance costs by either upgrading abatement technology 
or lowering production level. The aim of profit maximization motivates them to adjust 
production and investment expenditures according to individual efficiencies. To 
simulate the policy uncertainty related to CPM implementation, the experiment also 
incorporates a factor of regulation repeal that controlled by the computer-generated 
random probability. 
Research findings show that electricity price level increased as a result carbon pricing. 
In the spot electricity market, prices rose abruptly, while the price transition in the 
electricity derivative market was smoother. Modelling results further illustrate that 
short-term ETD derivatives manifested faster price transition than OTC contracts. This 
can be explained by the increasing speculation activities of financial intermediaries in 
the ETD market, which also drove up the turnover and liquidity. Furthermore, 
autoregressive model with conditional heteroscedastic error term is able to capture the 
dynamics of implied carbon price, which manifests the influence of policy uncertainty 
on market expectation. Due to the high carbon pass-through rate, carbon pricing caused 
rising price level in the wholesale electricity market, which in turn raised the expected 
return for those non-state-owned electric utility companies. As the dominant 
participants on the electricity derivative market, electricity generators and retailers have 
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little exposure to stock market. Therefore, the magnitude of volatility co-movement 
between implied carbon price and the AXUJ index of the Australian Stock Exchange 
during the effectiveness of CPM was limited. Furthermore, experimental observation 
demonstrates the negative effect of policy uncertainty on emission reduction. Emitters 
become less motivated with investment for abatement technology upgrade when the 
existence of regulation framework is in doubt. As a consequence of regulation 
termination, emitters with high emission intensities restart to emit because of no 
concerns over the compliance costs. 
Experience from the Australian CPM implementation demonstrate the effect of carbon 
pricing policy in constraining the GHG emissions of electricity sector. A well-
developed derivative market substantially reduces the price risk caused by carbon 
pricing. However, despite its effect in emission reduction and climate change mitigation, 
carbon pricing policy is still under pressure due to insufficient public support and 
political controversies. As a consequence, the induced policy uncertainty leads to 
speculations, which weaken the emission abatement motivation and overall policy 
outcome.  
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Climate Change and International Mitigation Policies 
Human activities have been continuously affecting Earth´s climate system. Scientific 
studies from diverse aspects confirmed that the increasing greenhouse gases (GHG) 
over the centuries caused by growing population and industrial activities were the 
reason for climate change (IPCC, 2014a). The consequence of climate change does not 
limit to the frequent extreme climate events such as heat waves, droughts, floods and 
wildfires, but also diverse environmental problems and huge economic losses (IPCC, 
2014a). This issue is a major challenge to the human society in the 21st century. 
Threats from climate change have initiated policy interventions internationally. The 
first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report in 1990 has drawn 
political attentions on this global issue. Consensus on the necessity to mitigate climate 
change led to the release of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 (Bodansky, 2001). Adoption of 
the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 signalled the international commitment to mitigate climate 
change effect through mandatory GHG emissions reduction target. However, due to the 
development needs of developing countries as well as the historical GHG emissions 
resulted by industrialized countries, the Principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities in the Kyoto Protocol has left enough flexibility to the participants 
regarding GHG reduction approach design (United Nations, 1998). Since the early 21st 
Century, policy frameworks in various forms have been established on national and 
international levels, in order to constrain the GHG emissions (IPCC, 2014b).   
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1.2 Review of Australian Carbon Pricing Policy 
International engagement to mitigate climate change effect motivated the policy action 
in Australia. After setting up the Prime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading 
in December 2006, Liberal Prime Minister John Howard proposed a Carbon Trading 
Scheme in July 2007 (Aulich & Evans, 2010). After the federal election victory, Labor 
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd ratified the Kyoto Protocol at the United Nations Climate 
Change Conference in December 2007 (Lawrence, 2009). The Australian government 
committed to reduce national GHG emissions by 5% below the level in 2000 by 2020 
through a cost-effective way (Department of Climate Change, 2008). Therefore, a price 
on carbon came into consideration, which aimed at limiting the GHG emissions whilst 
encouraging investment in clean energy. In February 2011, Prime Minister Julia Gillard 
unveiled an official plan to impose the fixed-rate carbon price, which was proposed to 
come into effect starting from July 2012 (Leslie, 2011). After release of the Clean 
Energy Bill 2011, Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) became effective on 1 July 2012 
with an initial price of 23 Australian Dollar (AUD) per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(tCO2-e). The price was set to increase at a rate of 4% annually until July 2015 (Clean 
Energy Act, 2011). Moreover, a transition to the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) was 
also scheduled onwards (Australian Government, 2013).  
Australia’s carbon pricing policy was associated with uncertainties throughout its 
implementation. Due to the lack of bipartisan agreement, Tony Abbott, leader of the 
federal opposition at that time, expressed the Liberal Party’s attitude against carbon 
price in any form in July 2010 (ABC, 2010). In 2013, the price crunch in the EU ETS 
market raised political debate about the eligibility of carbon pricing policy in Australia. 
Facing the continuous political pressures, Labor government proposed an early 
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transition from the carbon tax to the ETS shortly before the election in 2013. However, 
despite the previous rejections by the Senate in March and early July 2014, legislation 
proposed by the newly elected Coalition government to repeal CPM was passed in the 
Parliament on 17 July 2014 (ABC, 2014).  
1.3 Research Object  
Research in this thesis focuses on the Australian electricity sector including both spot 
market and derivative market for electricity. As the major GHG emitter, Australian 
electricity sector was exposed to the carbon pricing policy. According to the Clean 
Energy Act (2011), "the carbon price is applicable to a liable entity, which is either 
direct emitter of GHG or owns facilities with at least 25,000 tons of GHG emission per 
year". In 2013-14, coal and natural gas made up 66% and 13% of fuel sources for 
Australian electricity generation respectively (Department of Industry, Innovation and 
Science, 2015). Because of its reliance on fossil fuels, electricity sector contributed 33% 
of Australia’s national GHG emissions in 2015 (Department of the Environment, 2015).  
In December 1998, the National Electricity Market (NEM) was established as 
Australia’s electricity wholesale market. It is a pooling spot market, where generators 
and retailers trade electricity supplies. The NEM covers the major Australian states and 
regions including Queensland, New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory, 
Victoria and South Australia. With a distance of around 5,000 kilometres, it is also the 
world's longest power interconnection system. In 2014-2015, the annual electricity 
generation amount traded on NEM was 194 terawatt-hours (TWh), valued at some 
AUD $8.2 billion (AER, 2015).  
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Electricity derivative market is a crucial component of Australian electricity sector. It 
is the platform where electricity generators and retailers trade derivative contracts to 
hedge highly volatile electricity price. Australian electricity derivative market contains 
two distinct submarkets, namely over-the-counter (OTC) and exchange traded (ETD) 
markets. While the ETD market is an open trading platform for registered participants, 
trading parties negotiate bilaterally regarding the design of derivative contracts on the 
OTC market. In 2015, trading volume of the entire Australian electricity derivative 
market was 534 TWh (AER, 2015).  
1.4 Research Aims  
Economic studies could evaluate policy effect of CPM on the Australian electricity 
sector from different perspectives. As a market-based policy instrument, carbon price 
directly increased the electricity generation costs. It is therefore necessary to look into 
its influence on prices in relevant electricity markets. However, as CPM was under 
pressure due to the controversies throughout its implementation, study on the effect of 
such policy uncertainty could contribute to the future policy framework design and risk 
management. Furthermore, pricing carbon not only aims to constrain GHG emissions, 
but also gives emitters economic incentives to adopt low-emission technology. 
Therefore, research in this thesis also investigates whether carbon pricing policy is 
effective in limiting total emission and motivating investment in abatement technology 
under policy uncertainty. 
The research scope of this thesis covers effects of CPM implementation as well as the 
uncertainty associated with this policy framework on Australian electricity market. The 
specific research aims include: 
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1. To evaluate the changes in electricity spot and derivative markets that can be 
attributed to the CPM implementation. 
2. To study the market expectation on carbon price, since the CPM was politically 
contested throughout its implementation.    
3. To test whether market expectation of carbon price signaled by the electricity 
derivative market influenced the stock price volatility of electricity companies. 
4. To study the effects of policy uncertainty on production decisions and 
investment for abatement technology.      
While CPM could also influence other aspects of Australian electricity sector such as 
electricity supply and demand, carbon costs distribution and electricity generation 
capacity with renewable energy, these topics are not covered in the current study. 
1.5 Research Outline  
This thesis is a summary of three academic papers regarding the effects of carbon 
pricing policy on the Australian electricity sector.  
Chapter 2 analyses the effects of CPM implementation on Australian electricity spot 
and derivative markets. By looking into the magnitude of changes in price and volatility 
levels, it answers the question whether both markets have responded in a different way. 
Given that the carbon price was explicitly incorporated into the ETD contracts, whereas 
this was not the case for the OTC contracts, an implied carbon price can be derived. 
This price difference between the ETD and OTC contracts of the same class reveals 
market expectations on carbon price and the fate of CPM. By distinguishing between 
the ETD and OTC contracts, I look into the response in these two segments of the 
electricity derivative market. Besides evaluating characteristics such as turnover, 
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liquidity and speculation in the market for derivative contracts, price dynamics are also 
studied with the Smooth Transition Autoregressive (STAR) model. 
Chapter 3 further investigates the dynamics of market expectation of carbon price and 
its influence on the stock price variability of those electric utility companies listed on 
the Australian stock market. As carbon pricing policy was associated with controversies, 
an implied carbon price is derived from electricity derivative contracts to reveal market 
anticipation of carbon costs under policy uncertainty. It is linked with S&P/ASX 200 
Utilities (AXUJ) index of Australian Stock Exchange, in order to test its volatility co-
movement with stocks of Australian energy companies in the electric utility sector. 
Chapter 4 is an experimental study looking into the effect of policy uncertainty on 
production decisions and investment in abatement technology. The laboratory 
experiment simulates a closed economy, which contains eight heterogeneous emitters. 
Their production activities generate revenue and emissions, which induce compliance 
costs under regulation framework. While emitters could invest in abatement technology 
to reduce emissions and compliance costs, a computer-generated random probability 
controls the termination of regulation framework during the lab experiment. The 
experimental observations reveal the effect of policy uncertainty on emitters’ decisions 
and social welfare. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the study and draws conclusion.    
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CHAPTER 2  
The Effect of Carbon Price on Australian Electricity 
Spot and Derivative Markets1 
2.1 Introduction 
Concerns over the threat from climate change have prompted initiatives for mitigation 
policy in various jurisdictions around the world. After ratifying the Kyoto Protocol in 
2007, the Australian government outlined plans to reduce national greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions in line with its commitments (Department of Climate Change and 
Energy Efficiency, 2011). After several iterations of policy proposals, the Carbon 
Pricing Mechanism (CPM) was established as Australia's domestic GHG mitigation 
framework. The carbon price imposed under the CPM came into effect on 1 July 2012. 
It was initially set at a fixed rate of $23 per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2-e), 
and was set to increase at a rate of 4% annually until July 2015. A transition to an 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) was scheduled to start on July 1, 2015 (Clean Energy 
Act, 2011). Plans to link Australia’s CPM with the European Union's ETS in July 2018 
were also announced (Australian Government, 2013). However, as a result of change 
of government, the CPM was repealed on 17 July 2014.2  
                                                            
1 This study was supported by an Australian Research Council (ARC) Linkage Grant: "Emissions 
Trading and the Design and Operation of Australia's Energy Markets" in partnership with the Australian 
Financial Markets Association (AFMA). 
2 As the CPM became effective on 1 July 2012, it was used as a highly politically charged issue against 
the Labor Party during the 2013 election campaign. The proposal to accelerate towards an ETS did not 
save Labor Party from a large vote swing in September 2013. The new Liberal Party government led by 
Tony Abbot abolished the CPM in July 2014 (Rootes, 2014). 
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According to the IEA (2012), coal and natural gas make up 75% and 15% of fuel 
sources for electricity generation in Australia respectively. Consequently, the 
combustion of fossil fuels for electricity production generates a large amount of GHG 
emissions. Despite decreasing from its peak record in 2008-09, electricity sector is still 
the largest GHG emitter in Australia, which contributed 33% of national emissions in 
2015 (Department of the Environment, 2015). According to the Clean Energy Act 
(2011), "the carbon price is applicable to a liable entity, which is either direct emitter 
of GHG or owns facilities with at least 25,000 tons of GHG emission per year" (Clean 
Energy Regulator, 2013). Therefore, as an industry that heavily relies on the fossil fuels, 
Australian electricity sector was highly exposed to the CPM. 
Given the significance of the electricity industry for GHG emissions, carbon pricing 
and its effect on the electricity sector has been under research focus in recent years. 
According to economic theory, marginal costs of production should increase in line 
with the carbon costs. Under the assumption of perfect competitive market, the rate of 
carbon costs pass-through is expected to be 100% when demand with zero price 
elasticity and perfect elastic supply (i.e. flat line) are in place (Sijm et al., 2008). In this 
case, the marginal revenue increase due to the carbon costs pass-through should match 
with the incremental costs increase induced by carbon pricing. Kara et al. (2008) 
measured the elasticity of electricity price to the price of EU ETS allowances during 
the period from 2008 to 2012. They found that a 1 Euro/ tCO2-e carbon price change 
would bring on average a rise of 0.74 Euro per megawatt hour (MWh) in spot electricity 
price.3 Moreover, Bunn and Fezzi (2007) discovered a lagged pass-through of carbon 
                                                            
3 1 MWh = 1,000 Kilowatt hours (Kwh) 
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price for UK's electricity price. Zachmann and Von Hirschhausen (2008) also noted 
correlation between carbon price and electricity spot price in Germany.  
In addition to the studies conducted on the European market, there have been few 
studies on the impact of CPM on Australia's electricity sector. Wild et al. (2012) applied 
an agent-based model to explore the effect of carbon pricing on supply and demand in 
Australia's wholesale electricity market. His findings showed that the growth in average 
wholesale price and the carbon price pass-through rate differed across Australian states 
because of different combustion structure for electricity generation (e.g. NSW is more 
reliant on black coal, whereas Victoria is more reliant on brown coal and gas). 
O'Gorman and Jotzo (2014) also examined the impact of carbon price on Australia's 
electricity demand, supply and emissions. They found that it was hard to attribute all of 
the observed changes in demand and supply to the CPM implementation, although there 
was a clear short-term effect from the carbon pricing. After studying the impact of 
carbon price on Australian wholesale electricity market, Nazifi (2016) showed that 
carbon costs were fully passed to the electricity spot price. However, Garnaut (2014) 
concluded that the effects from the deepening integration into the global energy markets 
combined with the electricity market privatization were major drivers for the electricity 
price increases in Australia since the 21st Century. Also, there was little evidence 
showing that those price increases can be attributed to the recent carbon pricing policies. 
Meng (2014) compared electricity prices and emissions under different scenarios based 
on the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. His results suggest that the 
carbon tax not only raised wholesale electricity prices, but also influenced the emissions 
profile of the Australian electricity generation sector over the long term. Having 
evaluated CPM by taking its effects on electricity price, GDP growth and fiscal effects 
10 
 
into account, Robson (2014) pointed out that the poor policy implementation failed to 
gather sufficient public support, which finally led to the abolishment of CPM.  
While most existing literatures focused on the effect of CPM on the Australian 
electricity spot market, the current study extends its research scope to the electricity 
derivative market. In order to look explicitly into the impact of carbon pricing on the 
Australian electricity markets, changes in price level and volatility that can be attributed 
to the CPM implementation are measured. Furthermore, imposing carbon price also 
affected other market characteristics such as turnover and liquidity condition. Due to 
the cost effect of carbon pricing, it is expected that participants undertook ad hoc risk 
management prior to the policy effectiveness, which could push up turnover and 
enhance liquidity condition in the electricity derivative market. While some trading 
activities can be attributed to hedging purpose, others were due to speculations induced 
by carbon pricing. Hence, measuring the magnitude of speculations uncovers the true 
reason of liquidity improvement in the electricity derivative market. Examining these 
aspects also contributes to the evaluation of market response to the carbon pricing 
policy. In addition, this study investigates the distinct effects manifested within the 
market for derivative contracts by distinguishing between the exchange-traded (ETD) 
and over-the-counter (OTC) contracts. Due to the separate carbon costs settlement 
provision, carbon price was excluded from the OTC contracts, while this was not the 
case for the ETD contracts. Hence, price of the former is termed as “carbon-clean”. 
This enables the derivation of an implied carbon price, which is the price difference 
between the ETD and OTC contracts of the same class. It can be used to draw inference 
about market participants’ expectation regarding the fate of CPM, which was politically 
contested throughout its implementation.  
11 
 
The paper is organized as follows: the data and methods applied in the study are 
described in the next section, which is followed by a section that describes the 
modelling framework. This is followed by the summary of results and the discussion 
on the observed adjustment and transition phenomena in the electricity markets. The 
fifth section concludes.  
2.2 Data and Method 
2.2.1 Data 
The analysis of spot electricity price was based on the daily average Regional Reference 
Price (RRP) in three major Australian states (New South Wales, Queensland and 
Victoria) from 1st July, 2010 to 30th June 2014 (Figure 2.1).4  As the operator of 
wholesale electricity market, the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) reports 
the average wholesale spot price based on the dispatch prices within an interval of 30 
minutes. Based on the 48 spot prices reported for 24 hours of a day, daily RRP was 
derived by the AEMO as official price of the National Electricity Market (NEM). The 
NEM covers Queensland (QLD), New South Wales (NSW), the Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT), Victoria (VIC) and South Australia (SA) (AEMO, 2014). It is a 
pooling spot market, where electricity generators trade with electricity retailers. In 
2014-2015, the annual electricity generation amount traded on NEM was 194 TWh, 
valued at some AUD $8.2 billion (AER, 2015).5 
                                                            
4 The electricity use in New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria comprised over 90% of the NEM 
electricity consumption between 2000 to 2014 (AER, 2014).   
5 1 AUD = 0.7559 USD according to reference exchange rate published by Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA) on 11 April 2016. 
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The electricity derivative market is a crucial component of the Australian electricity 
sector. Due to the varying demand, electricity market is characterized with high price 
volatility. Therefore, generators and retailers apply electricity derivatives to hedge their 
price exposure (AER, 2013; Worthington et al., 2005). In 2012-13, the overall 
underlying electricity demand traded on this market reached 633 TWh (AFMA, 2014). 
The Australian electricity derivative market is comprised of two distinct submarkets, 
namely the ETD and the OTC market. In contrast to the OTC market, where participants 
negotiate bilaterally tailored derivative contracts, registered participants trade 
standardized derivative contracts in the ETD market.  
The study of the electricity derivative market covers the ETD and OTC markets for 
NSW, QLD and VIC from 1st July 2009 to 4th December 2013. The analysis of the 
ETD market was based on the ASX Energy daily market data for Quarterly Futures and 
Strip Futures Option.67 Data on daily closing prices, traded volume and outstanding 
interest were procured from ASX Energy.  
Analysis of the OTC market was based on the daily forward curves provided by the 
Australian Financial Markets Association (AFMA).8 The OTC Strip Forward Curve is 
an average price built up by the forward curves with maturities up to one year (Figure 
                                                            
6 ASX Energy, the energy submarket of Australian Stock Exchanges, is Australia’s major real-time 
electricity derivatives trading platform. In 2013, there were 156,674 financial contracts traded on ASX 
Energy, which equals to the value of $16 billion or 333 TWh (ASX Energy, 2013) 
7  The Strip Futures Option is an option on consecutively traded quarterly futures bought or sold 
simultaneously. 
8 The Australian Financial Markets Association (AFMA) is a financial industry association with more 
than 130 members ranging from leading banks to financial companies such as broker and energy trading 
institutions. It collects OTC financial product data independently from contributors on daily basis. The 
forward curves are daily average OTC electricity forward prices.   
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2.2). The range of data for the OTC products was from 1 July 2009 to 4th December 
2013. All data include only derivative contracts with non-zero trading volume. 
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Figure 2.2: An Overview of Price Profile for ETD (Base Load Quarterly Futures and Base Load 
Strip Futures Option) and OTC (OTC Base Load Quarterly Forward Curve and OTC Base 
Load Strip Forward Curve) Electricity Derivatives (01/07/2009-01/12/2013) 
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Base Load Strip Futures Option 
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OTC Base Load Quarterly Forward Curve 
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OTC Base Load Strip Forward Curve 
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2.2.2 Indicators for the Effect of CPM on Electricity Price and 
Volatility 
2.2.2.1 Changes in Electricity Price  
The CPM came into effect on 1st July 2012 with an initial tax rate of $23 per tCO2-e 
for 2012-13. The actual carbon price experienced by the liable entities in the electricity 
sector was dependent on the Carbon Dioxide Equivalent Intensity Index (CDEII) 
(AEMO, 2013), which is given by: 
ܥܽݎܾ݋݊ ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ = ܩ݁݊݁ݎܽݐ݅݋݊(ܯܹℎ) × ܥܦܧܫܫ(ݐܥܱ2-݁/ܯܹℎ) × ܶܽݔ ܴܽݐ݁($/ݐܥܱ2-݁)   (2.1) 
, where CDEII is the daily emission intensity published by the AEMO, which is 
dependent on generator's specific thermal efficiency.  
In order to isolate the effect of the CPM from the inherent electricity price fluctuations, 
the carbon-exclusive electricity price was derived. The electricity price excluding the 
carbon component was defined as follows: 
ܥܽݎܾ݋݊-ܧݔ݈ܿݑݏ݅ݒ݁ ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ = ܲݎ݅ܿ݁($/ܯܹℎ) 
                                                − ܥܦܧܫܫ(ݐܥܱ2-݁/ܯܹℎ) × ܶܽݔ ܴܽݐ݁ ($/ݐܥܱ2-݁)    (2.2) 
An comparison between the actual electricity price and carbon-exclusive one could 
reveal the magnitude of spot electricity price increase due to the CPM implementation.  
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2.2.2.2 Changes in Electricity Price Volatility  
In order to measure the magnitude of dispersion in spot electricity prices, daily volume-
weighted volatilities for RRP were calculated as:   
                           ߪ௧ = ඩ
∑ ݓ௜(݌௜ − ݌௧)ଶே௜ୀଵ
(ܰ − 1)
ܰ ∑ ݓ௜
ே
௜ୀଵ
, ݓℎ݁ݎ݁    ݌௧ =
∑ ݓ௜݌௜ே௜ୀଵ
∑ ݓ௜ே௜ୀଵ
                          (2.3) 
, where σ௧ denotes the volume-weighted volatility of day t, N represents the number of 
price observations during the day t (in case of RRP, N equals to 48, as there are 48 
observations of half-hourly prices within a day). Pi denotes the price of the time interval, 
which is weighted by w௜ and ݌௧ is the daily weighted-mean.  
Implied volatility is an indirect way to look into the expectations about underlying price 
variation embedded in the derivative price. In contrast to the historical volatility, which 
is typically presented by the standard deviation of the past spot prices, the implied 
volatility is derived from the current price of derivative contracts. This measure of 
volatility implicitly reveals the anticipated future fluctuations in electricity price until 
the maturity of the associated electricity derivatives (Chevallier, 2011a; Hull, 2006; 
Mayhew, 1995). Hence, this study also looked into the implied volatility for Strip 
Futures Option. Equation (2.4) describes the derivation of the implied volatility for 
European call option based on the Black-Scholes Model (Merton, 1976),  
         ( )1 2( , ) ( ) ( )
r T tC S t N d S N d Ke                  (2.4) 
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, where C(S,t) is the option price with the underlying asset currently priced at S; t 
denotes the remaining time to maturity, when the option could be exercised at the strike 
price K. The implied volatility is calculated by numerically inverting the Black-Scholes 
Model (Chriss, 1996), which is done by MATLAB. For simplicity, the underlying price 
S was set equal to the strike price K, so that it is the "at-the-money" implied volatility.9  
2.2.2.3 Liquidity and Speculation Ratio 
Market liquidity conditions can reflect the effect of carbon pricing on the Australian 
electricity derivative market. Daskalakis and Markellos (2009) found that liquidity in 
the European electricity derivatives market increased as a result of concerns over the 
risk associated with the carbon price. Due to the effect of CPM implementation, it is 
expected that participants in the Australian electricity derivative market undertook ad 
hoc activities to manage their exposures to the carbon price. Hence, a ratio measuring 
the relationship between turnover of derivative electricity market and underlying 
demand in the spot electricity market was employed to assess the overall liquidity 
conditions in the electricity derivative market (AFMA, 2014). A high liquidity ratio 
indicates more frequent trading activities in the derivative market based on the same 
underlying demand. This implies more transactions on the market, which can be 
interpreted either as a rise of hedge activities or increasing speculations.   
In order to explain the reasons for the changes in liquidity conditions during the carbon 
price era, extent of speculative activities in the electricity derivative market was 
                                                            
9 An option is called ‘at-the-money’, when the underlying’s market price equals to its strike price.   
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evaluated. The very purpose of derivative trading could be characterized either as 
hedging or speculation. In addition to generators and retailers, who use derivatives to 
manage their exposures to the future variation in electricity prices, other participants 
may attempt to make speculative profit in the derivative market. The magnitude of 
speculative activities discloses the reason for liquidity improvement in the electricity 
derivative market. Following the SPEC ratio proposed by Lucia et al. (2014), the 
current study applies this methodology to quantify the extent of speculation in the daily 
European Emission Allowance Futures Market, which was given as: 
                                         /t t tSPEC V OI      (2.5) 
, where tV  is the trading volume of each trading period t and tOI  denotes the open 
interest at the end of a corresponding trading period. The open interest is the cumulated 
number of trades, which are not closed out by the end of period t. It is unchanged until 
both counterparties close their positions. As speculators take advantage of the short-
term market trend, they enter and exit the market quickly, which in turn generates a 
high trading volume but an unchanged open interest. Therefore, the SPEC ratio is 
positively correlated with the speculative activity on the market (Robles et al., 2009). 
This methodology is also applicable to the derivative market for electricity contracts. 
When higher market liquidity is observed, the SPEC ratio could be used to infer whether 
it is predominantly due to the rising speculation activity. The SPEC ratio was derived 
based on the daily open interest and trading volume statistics for electricity derivative 
contracts, which were included in the procured dataset from ASX Energy.  
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2.2.2.4 Implied Carbon Price  
In order to explore the market valuation of carbon price and expectations about the fate 
of CPM, an implied carbon price was derived based on the two separate mechanisms to 
incorporate the carbon component in the ETD and OTC markets. According to the 
AFMA Carbon Benchmark Addendum, the carbon price was added separately to the 
OTC derivative contracts at maturity (AFMA, 2012).10 As a result, in contrast to the 
ETD market, where the carbon price was inclusive in the electricity derivative price, 
the carbon component was excluded from the OTC derivative price. Following the 
assumption of efficient market, asset prices should reflect all the available market 
information, so that financial products with the same conditions and underlying assets 
are supposed to demonstrate equal price (Malkiel & Fama, 1970). Therefore, the price 
difference between the ETD and the OTC derivative of the same class and maturity can 
be articulated as an implied carbon price (EUAA, 2011). In this study, implied carbon 
price represented the spread between the Quarterly Baseload Electricity Futures traded 
on ASX and the OTC Quarterly Baseload Forward Curve with the same maturity:  
Implied Carbon Price  ( ), ,( ) 
ETD OTCPrice t T Price t T     (2.6) 
, where t indicates the trading date and T denotes the maturity date.  
                                                            
10 The Carbon Benchmark Addendum was released by the Australian Financial Market Association 
(AFMA) to neutralize the carbon price risk on the OTC derivative market. As a financial industry 
association with more than 130 members, the AFMA manages a comprehensive system of industry 
accepted standards and conventions, which ensures that Australia’s OTC markets operation is consistent 
with international capital market standards. 
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The implied carbon price provides insight regarding the market expectation on the fate 
of carbon pricing policy. While carbon costs were priced into the ETD electricity 
derivative contracts, prices of OTC electricity derivatives were “carbon-clean”. 
Therefore, price difference between the same class ETD and OTC electricity derivative 
contracts of identical maturity should reveal the expectation that participants held about 
the future carbon price level. Although fixed-rate carbon price was in place throughout 
the lifetime of CPM, market valuation of carbon price is expected to vary due to the 
continuous political contest on the policy. Hence, the path of implied carbon price not 
only reflects the dynamic market valuation of carbon costs, but also reveals the 
influence of policy uncertainty on the public anticipation on the future of carbon pricing 
policy in Australia. 
2.3 Modelling the Price Transition in the Electricity Derivative Market  
2.3.1 Motivation for Model Selection  
Electricity market is characterized with nonlinear and mean-reverting price movement 
as a result of high price volatility (Higgs & Worthington, 2008; Worthington et al., 
2005). In recent years, nonlinear time series models have been widely applied to analyse 
electricity price dynamics (De Jong & Huisman 2002; Janczura & Weron 2012; 
Janczura & Weron 2010; Weron et al. 2004).  
Looking at the data for the present study, clear nonlinearity was detected in the 
electricity derivative price data for all three states (NSW, VIC and QLD) using the 
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Brock, Dechert and Scheinkman (BDS) test (Appendix A). Furthermore, the observed 
price level transition during the carbon price era motivated further investigation using 
a non-linear econometric model (Figure 2.2).  
The Smooth Transition Autoregressive (STAR) model, developed by Terasvirta and 
Anderson (1992), is a variant of the Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model introduced 
by Tong (1983). As an extension of the autoregressive (AR) model, it enables the 
division of one-dimensional space into k regimes with a linear autoregressive model. 
Thus, it can be used to model the process of price regime switching from one local 
dynamics to another, where separate regimes are characterized with different linear 
autoregressive parametrization. The switch of regimes is determined by exogenous 
threshold value (Chan & Tong, 1986; Dijk et al., 2002). This feature of the STAR model 
is especially appropriate for modelling nonlinear electricity prices (Baum et al., 2001; 
Taylor et al., 2001; Taylor & Peel, 2000). As an innovative model for energy market 
analysis, the STAR model has been applied for electricity demand forecasting and price 
modelling (Amaral et al., 2008; Chen & Bunn, 2010; Lee & Chiu, 2011; Robinson, 
2000).  
Modelling the Australian electricity derivative prices using the STAR model can 
provide insights about the transition of pricing regimes under the effect of the CPM. 
The use of the STAR model was justified by the nonlinear price movements observed 
and tested (Appendix A) in the OTC and ETD markets.  
  
26 
 
2.3.2 Smooth Transition Autoregressive Model 
A STAR model for a univariate time series of order p is defined as follows:  
 ' '10 1 20 2( ) ( )t t t t d ty a a y a a y F y u                     (2.7)     
    
2
1
1
(0, )
( ,..., ) ', 1, 2,
( ,..., ) ',
t
j j jp
t t t p
u nid
a a a j
y y y

 
 


     
, where ty  is a vector of price, ja  is a vector of autoregressive parameters, the ut is 
normally and independently distributed (n.i.d.) error term. The monotonic function 
F(yt−d) represents a continuous transition function bounded between 0 and 1:  
                F(yt−d; γ, c)= (1+exp[−γ(yt−d −c)])−1    γ>0            (2.8) 
In comparison to the discontinuous abrupt transition in the standard TAR model, the 
STAR model is characterized by a smooth transition function. It allows a dynamic 
switch of regime according to the relation between the lagged times series variable t dy   
and the threshold value c. A regime-switching process is triggered once the lagged 
variable t dy  is beyond the threshold value c (Duekeret al., 2010). The speed of 
transition is represented by the parameter γ, which is typically non-negative. Together 
with the threshold value c, the parameter γ determines the local regime dynamics. For 
instance, when γ→∞ and t dy  > c, the F( t dy  ) approaches unity, which makes the 
model converge to a regular TAR(p) model.  
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2.3.3 STAR Model Estimation Procedure 
The STAR modelling employed the data described in section 2.2.1 to study the 
transition process of the electricity derivative price. Period prior to 2012 was included 
to highlight and capture the entire transition process. The data were transformed to 
logarithm of first difference ( 1ln lnt tp p ), in order to eliminate seasonality and non-
stationarity. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results indicate that all data became 
stationary after the transformation, so that their statistical properties could be well 
approximated by the time series model. Parameter estimation for the STAR model 
followed the procedure introduced by Teräsvirta (1994). The order of the AR model (p) 
was specified according to the autocorrelation function (ACF) and the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). The appropriate value for the delay parameter d could be 
determined by an F-version of a LM-type test following the auxiliary regression given 
by Teräsvirta (1994):  
       2 30 1 2 3 4
1 1 1
....
p p p
t t j t j t d j t j t d j t j t d t
j j j
y x R R R R R R          
  
           (2.9) 
Under the null hypothesis, the F-version LM-type test assumes linearity in the data with 
the null hypothesis being 0 2 3 4: 0j j jH      . The delay parameter d, which is the 
own lag of the transformed logarithm first difference of prices, was determined by 
iterative regression process until the H0 is rejected. In case of multiple rejections against 
the null hypothesis, the parameter d with a minimum p-value was selected following 
the estimation procedure suggested by Teräsvirta (1994).  
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Parameter estimation of the STAR model was carried out in MATLAB, using the 
nonlinear least squares procedure.11 The estimated values included the threshold value 
c, the transition speed γ, and the other nonlinear regression parameters. Under the 
iterative reweighted least squares algorithm for nonlinear regressions, the robust 
weights were recalculated based on each observation’s residual from the previous 
iteration. The estimation achieved robust results when the weights converge (Giovanis, 
2008). According to the standard assumptions made for STAR model estimation, the 
initial value of γ was set at 0, while the starting value for the threshold parameter c was 
set at the mean price for the electricity derivative in question.  
2.4. Results and Discussions 
2.4.1 Price Adjustment and Emission Intensity Reduction in the 
Electricity Spot Market 
The CPM implementation caused abrupt regime shift in electricity spot prices. On 1st 
July 2012, the day when CPM came into effect, daily RRP rose by $24.64/MWh in 
NSW, $21.13/MWh in QLD, and $22.16/MWh in VIC (Figure 2.1). As emission 
intensities in the observed states were around 1 tCO2-e/MWh (Table 2.1), magnitude of 
RRP increase was approximately the same as the official carbon price of $23/ tCO2-e. 
Over the lifetime of CPM, average RRP levels for the three observed states were higher 
and statistically different to the price levels prior to carbon pricing (Table 2.2). Average 
RRP in QLD jumped from $32/MWh to $59.12/MWh followed by VIC, where average 
                                                            
11 The nonlinear least square regression procedure follows a “no grid search” approach. The estimation 
starts from an initial value and stops when convergence is achieved.  
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RRP level increased from $28.32/MWh to $52.66/MWh. In NSW, average wholesale 
electricity price rose by $18.89/MWh and changed from $34.28/MWh to $53.17/MWh. 
After removing carbon component from electricity prices as described in Equation (2.2), 
the difference between RRP and carbon-exclusive spot electricity prices can illustrate 
the effects from CPM implementation (Table 2.2).  
Table 2.1: An Overview of Average Emission Intensities on Australian Wholesale Electricity 
Market (01/07/2009 - 30/06/2016) 
 01/07/2009-30/06/2012 01/07/2012-30/06/2014 01/07/2014-30/06/2016 
NSW 0.9377 0.9048 0.8895 
 (0.0299) (0.0338) (0.0318) 
QLD 0.8342 0.8300 0.8424 
 (0.0216) (0.0192) (0.0252) 
VIC 1.2436 1.1746 1.175 
 (0.0533) (0.0614) (0.0603) 
       Standard error in parentheses  
                                                                                                                Data Source: AEMO (2016) 
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Imposing carbon price led to reduction of emission intensities in the Australian 
electricity spot market. Table 2.1 summarises the level of average emission intensities 
for the period from 01/07/2009 to 30/06/2016 as well as for the sub-periods (i) prior to 
the carbon tax, (ii) during the carbon tax, and (iii) for the post-tax period. In comparison 
to the period prior to carbon pricing, average emission intensities in all states declined 
after CPM implementation. While VIC achieved the most emission intensity reduction, 
where it decreased from 1.24 tCO2-e/MWh to 1.17 tCO2-e/MWh, average emission 
intensity in QLD remained approximately unchanged around 0.83 tCO2-e/MWh. In 
NSW, average emission intensity declined from 0.94 tCO2-e/MWh to 0.91 tCO2-
e/MWh after imposing carbon price. Overall, there was a reduction in emission 
intensities of approximately 3.5% for NSW, 0.05% for QLD and 5.5% for VIC. 
However, for post-tax period, emission intensities reverted almost to the level prior to 
CPM implementation in NSW, and to an even higher level of 0.86 tCO2-e/MWh in 
QLD. Emission intensity in VIC increased slightly after the repeal of carbon price, 
which was still lower than in the pre-tax period. 
Furthermore, different levels of emission intensities across Australian states caused 
inconsistent increase in electricity spot prices. Throughout the sample period, the 
highest average emission intensities appeared in VIC (1.21 tCO2-e/MWh), followed by 
NSW (0.93 tCO2-e/MWh) and QLD (0.84 tCO2-e/MWh). However, as a result of 
varying electricity demand and applied generation mix on a specific day, time series 
sourced from the AEMO illustrated that daily emission intensities measured in tCO2-
e/MWh changed dramatically on a day-by-day basis. Figure 2.3 demonstrates the 
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substantial fluctuations of emission intensities from 01/07/2009 to 30/06/2016. A 
moving average over 120 days for each region further illustrated the long-term changes 
in average emission intensities for these markets. As pointed out by O’Gorman and 
Jotzo (2014), there was a reduction in emission intensities for most states during the 
effectiveness of carbon tax, which can be observed in the time series plot as well.   
Figure 2.3: Emission intensities for NSW (upper panel), QLD (second panel) and VIC (bottom 
panel) with moving average of 120 days (red line) (01/07/2009 -30/06/2016) 
 
Data Source: AEMO (2016) 
Different energy structures for electricity generation across Australian states also 
caused difference in spot electricity price adjustments and carbon costs. Australia’s 
electricity generation still relies on fossil fuels. In 2013-14, black and brown coal 
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generators contributed 74% of electricity supply in the NEM, while gas powered 
generators delivered 12% of supply. In general, the coal-fired generators have higher 
emission intensity than gas-powered generators. And brown-coal fired generators (high 
reliance in VIC) have greater emission intensity than the black-coal fired ones (high 
reliance in NSW and QLD). This balances out as NSW and QLD are more reliant on 
coal fired generation (more than 65% of the output), while VIC is somewhat less reliant 
on coals (around 50% of the output comes from coal-fired stations) (AER, 2013). The 
carbon component of the wholesale electricity price from July 2012 to end of June 2014 
was on average $21.35, $19.58 and $27.72 for NSW, QLD and VIC. Therefore, the 
average pass-through during the carbon price era was 91%, 83% and 117% 
respectively.12 As the real carbon costs were determined by the legislated carbon price 
and actual emission intensities of generators (Equation 2.1), the differences of emission 
intensities across states due to combustion efficiency and fuel consumption structure 
may be an important factor for the observed discrepancy in electricity price reaction to 
the CPM. 
Besides, other cost factors also caused increase of wholesale electricity price during the 
carbon pricing era. Despite the privatisation of electricity assets, the majority of 
capacity in NSW and QLD are still under control of government-owned corporations, 
while most generation capacity in VIC is owned by private business (AER, 2013). In 
comparison, magnitude of electricity price increase in VIC was the lowest during the 
                                                            
12 The carbon pass-through rate was derived by calculating the proportion of carbon price (described in 
Eq. 2.1 in Section 2.2.2.1) in the wholesale electricity price according to the daily CDEII index published 
by AEMO. 
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effectiveness of carbon price. Hence, it could be concluded that generation ownership 
structure influenced the price competition in the electricity market. Moreover, the 
network upgrade investment also pushed up the electricity price level. While AER 
estimates an average carbon pass-through of 17.70 $/MWh to the spot price, the price 
increase in 2012-13 across NEM is on average around 31 $/MWh (AER, 2014). The 
statistics by AER (2014) indicate that network upgrade expenditures caused significant 
increase of wholesale electricity price. Variation in generation technologies, differences 
in demand elasticity and the variances in market structure contributed to the regional 
discrepancy in the magnitude of price increase as well. Other factors such as changes 
in capital costs and plant-outages events high network costs could have also affected 
the magnitude of spot price change. 
2.4.2 Smooth Price Transition in the Electricity Derivative Market 
The price adjustment processes under the CPM were found to be different between the 
ETD and OTC markets. The average price gradually increased for all ETD contracts. 
On the other hand, prices in the OTC markets decreased slightly for derivative contracts 
in NSW and VIC, whereas they increased markedly for QLD (Table 2.3, Figure 2.2).13 
Since the AFMA Carbon Benchmark Addendum allowed carbon price settlement for 
OTC derivatives at maturity (AFMA, 2012), prices of OTC derivative contracts were 
                                                            
13 Because of its low emission intensity among fossil fuels, there was an increasing international demand 
on Australian gas production since the early 21st century. Rising export price as well as capital costs due 
to the investment on liquefied natural gas infrastructure contributed to the higher domestic gas price in 
Australia. In Queensland, where electricity generation considerably relies on gas-powered generators, 
there was a greater magnitude of electricity price increase due to the gas price rather than the carbon 
price implementation (Garnaut, 2008). The rising price level was therefore related to the expectation on 
higher energy price. 
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effectively free of carbon tax costs. Consequently, the observed differences in price 
dynamics over time between ETD and OTC contracts of the same class can be used to 
make inferences about the effect of CPM on electricity derivative prices. Furthermore, 
due to the seasonal variation in the short-term electricity demand, the OTC Quarterly 
Forward Curve demonstrated a cyclical price movement. In contrast, the level of OTC 
Strip Forward Curve remained stable within the $30 to $40 interval, as it represents the 
average annual price for the underlying electricity demand (Figure 2.2). This implies 
that, taking aside the uncertainty over the carbon price, the participants expected the 
electricity price would remain relatively stable in the longer period.
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STAR modelling results are presented in Table 2.4. The results indicate that most of 
the estimated transition speeds (γ) for the observed derivative contracts were close to 
unity. Since unity speed represents a transition process following a standard logistic 
function (Giovanis, 2008), this finding indicates a convincing smooth transition process 
in the electricity derivative market. As an exception, the transition speed for the OTC 
Quarterly Forward Curve in QLD was 2.17. This was partially due to the quick price 
increase observed from the third quarter of 2013 (Figure 2.2), which was related to the 
local demand and energy price fluctuation (AER, 2013). Second, the short-term 
derivative contracts in the ETD market experienced faster price transition. In 
comparison to the Quarterly Futures, the OTC Forward Curve in NSW and VIC had 
lower γ (Table 2.4). The pure price transition characteristics extracted from the STAR 
modelling results indicate a highly sensitive price response in the ETD market as a 
result of the higher liquidity and market transparency. Since the ETD derivative price 
included the carbon costs, the upward trend reflected the same effect of CPM 
implementation as on the short-term electricity spot price. However, there was no 
significant difference in γ value for the strip contracts in both ETD and OTC markets. 
This reflected a relatively stable price level for electricity derivative contracts over 
longer term. The likely reason for this was the specification of the strip contracts. As a 
derivative product comprised of consecutive traded quarterly contracts covering a 
whole year, the strip derivatives did not show the same price adjustment flexibility as 
the short-term derivatives. 
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Table 2.4: STAR Modelling Results 
The second column indicates the estimated delay parameter d. The fifth and sixth columns indicate the 
characteristics root for modulus in upper (F=1) and lower (F=0) regimes. 
 
 
Quarterly Futures 
State γ d AR (p) Modulus(Low) Modulus(High) 
NSW 1.34 3 8 0.0925 0.4850 
QLD 0.73 5 9 0.2941 0.3371 
VIC 1.67 2 10 0.7659 0.8015 
Strip Futures Option 
State γ d AR (p) Modulus(Low) Modulus(High) 
NSW 1.05 3 6 0.2243 0.3697 
QLD 1.60 4 4 0.9125 0.5853 
VIC 1.72 3 3 0.7323 0.5344 
OTC Quarterly Forward Curve 
State γ d AR (p) Modulus(Low) Modulus(High) 
NSW 1.04 3 5 0.8256 0.2578 
QLD 2.17 7 2 0.7585 0.5520 
VIC 1.49 5 5 0.0746 0.9930 
OTC Strip Forward Curve 
State γ d AR (p) Modulus(Low) Modulus(High) 
NSW 1.12 10 10 0.3261 0.5180 
QLD 1.70 2 8 0.6207 0.5196 
VIC 1.70 1 9 0.4954 0.3205 
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The results obtained from the STAR model estimation were validated by residual 
analysis and characteristic roots tests. The residuals that remained after the STAR 
model fitting were dramatically reduced. The skewness of residuals suggests they 
follow white noise. Moreover, the Ljung-Box test statistics rejected the hypothesis of 
remaining autocorrelation among the residuals at 5% level. In addition, the 
characteristic roots were calculated by solving the following polynomials:  
   
^ ^
1 2
1
( ) 0
p
p p j
j j
j
Z w w F Z 

      F=0, 1                     (2.10) 
All roots modulus in upper (F=1) and lower (F=0) regimes were found to lie within the 
unit circle (Table 2.4). According to the stability condition for the polynomial system, 
this indicates converging estimation results for the time series model (Enders, 2004; 
Mori et al., 1981).   
2.4.3 Volatility Changes in the Electricity Markets 
The extents of electricity spot price volatility adjustment over the period varied across 
states. After imposing carbon price, the average daily volatilities increased in QLD, 
while it decreased in NSW and VIC (Table 2.2). After removing the carbon component, 
volatility levels of carbon-exclusive spot electricity prices (July 2012 to July 2014) rose 
slightly in VIC, while it decreased in NSW (Table 2.2). However, the extraordinary 
higher volatility for carbon-exclusive electricity price in QLD implied that carbon 
pricing was not the major issue causing large degree of price dispersion in this state. 
According to the reports of market regulator, due to the increasing costs caused by 
40 
 
carbon pricing, there were changes in merit order for electricity generation in QLD 
(AEMO, 2013b, Wild et al., 2012). As a less carbon-intensive energy, gas became 
preferred by generators because of its economic attractiveness. For instance, there was 
increased dispatch to the relatively more expensive Natural Gas Combined-Cycle 
(NGCC) and gas thermal plants during the peak period after the effectiveness of CPM. 
The rising electricity generation costs by gas and NGCC were directly transferred to 
electricity prices, which caused significant increase in price level. Furthermore, other 
reasons such as grid congestion and extreme weather condition in 2013 and 2014 also 
induced fluctuation in spot electricity prices. For instance, the heat waves in January 
2013 caused a series of price spikes during in QLD (Figure 2.4). 14  Therefore, 
unexpectedly demand-driven price changes also influenced the volatility level of spot 
electricity prices (AER, 2014; AER, 2013; AER, 2012). 
On electricity derivative market, in comparison to the significant fluctuations before 
2012, the implied volatility of ETD products stayed relatively stable during the CPM 
implementation (Figure 2.5). A relatively stable implied volatility level suggests that 
market participants did not anticipate fundamental change in electricity price level over 
the life of CPM. 
                                                            
14 Extreme volatilities have been removed from the figure, in order to make a better illustration about 
the overall trend in each state.   
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2.4.4 Liquidity and Speculation in the Electricity Derivative Market   
The liquidity of electricity derivative market reached its highest level before the 
introduction of the CPM in July 2012. After a dramatic growth from 1.2 to 3 in 2006-
07, the liquidity ratio grew significantly again in 2010-11, and attained a historical peak 
of 4.5 (Table 2.5). As the spot electricity demand in the NEM fluctuated between 
187.87 TWh and 197.36 TWh, the growth in liquidity could be attributed to the rising 
turnover in electricity derivative markets. Since 2004-05 the turnover in the total 
electricity derivative market kept growing until 2011, when it reached a historically 
highest level of 863 TWh (Table 2.5). This can be mainly attributed to the rapid growth 
of the ETD market. In the period from 2004 to 2014, the proportion of ETD in the 
overall market for derivative contracts climbed from 10.7% to 65.86%.  
The higher liquidity ratio was an evidence of the rising ad hoc risk management needs 
before the introduction of CPM. Despite the declining trading volumes in both ETD 
and OTC markets after 2010-11, the liquidity ratio stayed at an elevated level of around 
3.5. The growth in liquidity reflects increasing trading activities in Australia’s 
electricity derivative market in the carbon price era. The growing liquidity ratio before 
the introduction of the CPM indicates that the derivative contracts were traded more 
frequently based on the relatively constant electricity demand (Table 2.5). As major 
participants in the electricity derivative market, generators and retailers use derivatives 
to hedge their price exposure. Since carbon price increases the generation costs, the 
derivative products became more important for electricity market participants to lock 
in a future electricity price.  
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Table 2.5: Turnover and Liquidity Ratio of Australia's Electricity Derivative Market 
(01/07/2004-30/06/2014) 
Year OTC 
(TWh) 
ETD 
(TWh) 
Total Derivative 
Market 
(TWh) 
NEM 
Demand 
(TWh) 
Liquidity 
Ratio 
2004-05 198.88 23.82 222.70 187.87 1.2 
2005-06 177.13 54.65 231.77 192.51 1.2 
2006-07 337.17 243.00 580.17 193.91 3.0 
2007-08 304.08 240.79 544.88 195.14 2.8 
2008-09 208.07 300.83 508.90 197.36 2.6 
2009-10 221.01 398.90 619.91 195.34 3.2 
2010-11 314.60 548.64 863.24 192.30 4.5 
2011-12 227.03 436.90 663.94 188.95 3.5 
2012-13 291.18 341.68 632.86 183.73 3.4 
2013-14 250.76 386.70 637.46 178.61 3.6 
  Data source: AFMA (2008-2014) 
Increasing speculative trading activities also contributed to the liquidity improvement 
in the electricity derivative market. Prior to early 2012, speculation started to build up 
in the ETD electricity derivative market. The SPEC ratio for Quarterly Futures shows 
increasing speculation since the third quarter of 2011 until the end of 2012 (Figure 2.6). 
From September 2011 to the end of 2012, the average SPEC ratios in NSW, QLD and 
VIC jumped up by 65%, 91% and 30% respectively, in comparison to the period 
between May, 2010 and August 2011. On 13th September 2011, the SPEC ratio in QLD 
reached 0.7, which implies that 70% of the daily trading volume was due to the 
speculative activities. However, this high level of speculation faded away after the end 
of 2012. 
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Speculations induced by carbon pricing and changes in market participant structure are 
the likely reasons for the rising liquidity in electricity derivative market. As shown in 
Figure 2.6, SPEC ratio began to cluster in the ETD market since the third quarter of 
2011, which then faded away after the end of 2012. Meanwhile, financial intermediaries 
became increasingly active on electricity derivative market in the same period. From 
market turnover perspective, the volume traded by them almost doubled in comparison 
to the previous period on the OTC market (Figure 2.7).15 However, turnover traded by 
financial institutions shrank rapidly in 2012-13, during which generators and retailers 
regained dominance in the ETD market. Due to the fixed-rate carbon price, financial 
intermediaries could easily predict the magnitude of electricity price increase. 
Therefore, they opened up trading positions in the market before the CPM came into 
effect, and closed their positions once the level of price increase approached the 
predetermined carbon tax rate. The sudden decreasing SPEC ratio together with the 
changing market participant structure between 2012 and 2013 implied that speculators 
such as financial intermediaries left market with the speculative profits. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that speculative trading activities significantly enhanced the market 
liquidity before the carbon price came into effect.  
 
 
  
                                                            
15 Trading volume statistics by participants were only available for the OTC market, while no agency 
provided such statistics for the ETD market. The observation on the OTC market helps to infer the overall 
trend on the entire electricity derivative market. 
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Figure 2.7: Australia's OTC Electricity Derivative Market Turnover by Participants  
(01/07/2009-30/06/2014) 
 
Data Source: AFMA (2014) 
 
 
2.4.5 Changes in the Electricity Derivative Markets in the Carbon 
Price Era 
Active involvement of financial institutions stimulates the development of electricity 
derivative market. Their expertise in sophisticated derivative contracts provides 
professional financial service to the customers in the electricity sector. Moreover, the 
engagement of financial intermediaries also promotes innovation in risk management, 
which led to the turnover growth for derivatives such as swaps, swaptions, collars and 
Asian options over the CPM period (Figure 2.8).1617 Wider client coverage of financial 
intermediaries also helped to enhance the market liquidity.  
                                                            
16 A swaption is a compounded derivative contract. It is an option, which offers the trading parties a right 
to enter into a swap agreement with the predetermined conditions after certain date. 
17 A collar is a compounded derivative contract comprised of simultaneous buying and selling options at 
different strike prices, which aims at limiting gain or loss within certain range. 
An Asian option is an exotic derivative, whose payoff is dependent to the average price of reference 
underlying within certain period.  
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14
TW
h
Other
Intermediaries
Retailers
Generators
48 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Turnover of Australia's Total Electricity Derivative Market (01/07/2007-30/12/2014)  
 
The left bar in each year indicates the total turnover of ETD market. The right bar in each year 
indicates the total turnover of OTC market.   
Data Source: AFMA (2014) 
Furthermore, discrepancies in market transparency and flexibility also caused different 
price transition patterns on the markets for OTC and ETD electricity derivative 
contracts. As tailored financial contracts, OTC derivatives are usually bound between 
counterparties due to bilaterally negotiated term of trade, which make them inflexible 
for further trading and transactions. For instance, the reassignment of counterparty 
usually requires assistance from intermediaries, which increases the transaction costs. 
This leads to lower market liquidity, which caused lagged price reaction on the OTC 
electricity derivative market. In contrast, the low market barrier and high transparency 
of the ETD electricity derivative market enables a swift price reaction, which reflects 
the actual market trend under the influence of carbon pricing policy. 
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Electricity derivative market demonstrated its advantages in limiting price risk 
associated with the CPM. An efficient derivative market would substantially reduce the 
risk associated with carbon price. For instance, financial contracts such as caps, swaps 
and swaptions are able to mitigate price uncertainty, while leaving the potential for 
profit during the price adjustment in the carbon price era.18 Furthermore, the product 
structure in the electricity derivative market became more diversified since 2009-10. 
Despite the dominance of quarterly futures in the ETD market, the proportion of new 
products such as calendar options and caps grew significantly (Figure 2.8). In the OTC 
market, the market share of swaptions fell from 25% in 2011-12 to less than 8% in 
2012-13, while other products such as swaps gained greater significance.19 Moreover, 
sophisticated trading strategies that gained prominence over the period, such as the 
collar strategy, could also be used to lock in speculative profit during periods of high 
price volatility.  
2.4.6 Implied Carbon Price 
The implied carbon price reflects market response to the CPM implementation and 
expectation on the carbon costs. Although the Australian government already ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol in December 2007, domestic political debates delayed the 
introduction of carbon price (Table 2.6). For instance, Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme (CPRS) failed to pass the Parliament vote in August 2009. However, 
                                                            
18 A cap derivative is a financial agreement between two trading parties. It gives buyer the right to receive 
payment from seller at the end of each period if the underlying price exceeds the agreed strike price and 
vice versa.   
19 A Swaption is an option to enter into an electricity swap contract with the predetermined conditions. 
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announcement of a plan to price carbon emissions in February 2011 induced 
speculations. As a result, the market responded with an amplified spread between the 
prices for ETD and OTC derivative contracts, which quickly increased to the interval 
between $15/MWh and $20/MWh (Figure 2.9). After the pass of Clean Energy Bill in 
November 2011, it rallied to the level above $20/MWh, as the carbon price level was 
determined by the legislation. Since the effectiveness of carbon pricing policy in July 
2012, the implied carbon price reached its highest level of $23/MWh, which matched 
with the official carbon price for the FY 2012-13. However, it quickly returned to 
$20/MWh later on and remained stable until early 2013, as the noises from opponents 
against the carbon pricing continuously affected the market expectation. While 
concerns over the policy stability accumulated during Australia's federal election 
campaign in 2013, price collapse in the EU ETS market also casted doubts on the 
market-based policy instruments in Australia. As a consequence, implied carbon price 
declined to the level below $15/MWh in February 2013. Although Labor Party’s 
proposal for an early transition to the ETS caused a rebound for the implied carbon 
price in mid-2013, it began to decrease again and hit the $5/MWh mark by the end of 
year, as the Coalition started the carbon price repeal process right after their election 
victory in September 2013 (ABC, 2014).  
The implied carbon price also conveys information about the market sentiment 
throughout the CPM implementation. Although statement of no plan to impose carbon 
tax smoothed the mood in the electricity market until early 2011, disclosure of the 
carbon pricing policy in February 2011 lifted the implied carbon price quickly within a 
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short period of time (Table 2.6 and Figure 2.9). The relative stable level of implied 
carbon price in major Australian states onwards demonstrates the advantage of fixed-
rate carbon price in helping to build market-wide consistent carbon price expectation 
prior to the CPM effectiveness. However, emerging political controversies started to 
influence the market since the end of 2012. Figure 2.9 illustrates that price collapse in 
the overseas carbon market also raised concerns over the fate of CPM in Australia. 
Trend of implied carbon price since the third quarter of 2013 reflects the growing 
anticipation on the repeal of carbon price after the federal election. Overall, the dynamic 
path of implied carbon price shows that market sentiment was correlated with various 
political and economic incidents. The market continuously adjusted its valuation on the 
carbon costs according to the actual policy development. Hence, implied carbon price 
is also an indicator that reveals the market vision about the future of carbon pricing 
policy. 
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Table 2.6: A Timeline of Australia’s Carbon Price History (2009-2014) 
08.2009 CPRS legislation voted down in Parliament 
12.2009 Copenhagen talks fail 
07.2010 Labor Party rules out carbon tax  
02.2011 Labor Party unveils carbon tax plan 
11.2011 Carbon tax passes Senate 
07.2012 Carbon tax begins 
04.2013 Carbon price collapses in Europe 
07.2013 Labor Party announces plan from carbon tax to ETS 
09.2013 Coalition government starts process of repealing carbon tax 
11.2013 Legislation introduced to repeal carbon tax 
07.2014 Carbon tax repealed 
     Source: ABC (2014)
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2.5 Conclusion 
In July 2012, Australia introduced the Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) as its climate 
change mitigation policy. This paper studied its effect on the electricity spot and 
derivative markets. The electricity price level increased as a consequence of the CPM 
implementation. In contrast to the abrupt price adjustment in the electricity spot market, 
the price transition in the electricity derivative market was smoother, which shows its 
greater ability to absorb the risk associated with the carbon pricing. Furthermore, the 
exchange-traded (ETD) and the over-the-counter (OTC) derivative markets exhibited 
different price transition characteristics, which even differed across products. Futures 
contracts (ETD) exhibited higher speed of price transition than forwards (OTC), but 
strip futures option contracts (ETD) had lower price transition speed than the strip 
forward curve (OTC). This reflected the swift price reaction of the short-term ETD 
derivative contracts in terms of price adjustment. 
It was found that the CPM implementation was not the major cause for large volatility 
adjustments. Implied volatility remained stable over the period of investigation, and 
was not structurally changed as a result of the CPM. The fluctuation of implied carbon 
price demonstrated that the market valuation of CPM was influenced by political and 
economic events. It shows that public perception about the fate of the CPM throughout 
its life was reflected in the markets. The speculative opportunities due to CPM 
implementation motivated greater engagement of financial intermediaries in the 
electricity derivative market, which significantly enhanced the market liquidity. 
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Despite the changes in price level due to CPM imposition, fixed-rate carbon price made 
the magnitude of price increase predictable to the market. The smooth price transition 
process in the electricity derivative market showed that the derivatives have an 
advantage in absorbing the risk associated with the carbon price. As the OTC derivative 
contracts excluded the carbon component, the participants were able to lower their 
exposures to the future carbon price fluctuation. However, the ETD market may have 
been preferred because of its high liquidity and transparency. In the carbon price era, 
the product structure in Australia’s electricity derivative market became much more 
diversified. However, the fluctuating implied carbon price revealed that the 
environmental policy was still associated with considerable uncertainties. The 
experience from Australia’s CPM implementation emphasizes the importance of 
market transparency and policy persistence. The success of climate change mitigation 
efforts depends on policy consistency and long-term policy commitments.
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CHAPTER 3  
The Effect of Market Expectation of Carbon Price on 
the Stock Price Variability of Energy Companies in the 
Electric Utility Sector 
3.1 Introduction 
In July 2012, the Australian government imposed a price on carbon under the 
framework of Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM), in order to regulate greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. Although Garnaut (2011) pointed out that mitigating climate change 
effect is in Australia’s national interest, concerns over its economic impacts resulted in 
a weak public support for the CPM (Hanson, 2010; Jotzo, 2012). As a result of political 
controversies, the CPM was repealed in July 2014 before its planned transition to the 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) (Rootes, 2014). Policy uncertainty also caused 
inconsistent market expectations of carbon price and doubts about the fate of Australian 
climate change policy throughout the CPM implementation (Jotzo et al., 2012). 
As noted in the previous chapter, market expectation of carbon price could be extracted 
from the electricity derivative prices. Due to the rapidly changing electricity demand 
and limited generation capacity, electricity derivative market has become an important 
platform to manage price variation in Australia. As the country’s major GHG emitter, 
electricity sector including generation and utility service was highly exposed to the 
carbon price (AER, 2013b). Thus, carbon pricing was also a major issue influencing 
the electricity derivative market during the CPM implementation (AFMA, 2015). While 
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the carbon component was included in the price of exchange-traded (ETD) electricity 
derivative contracts, trading parties on the over-the-counter (OTC) market were 
allowed to postpone the carbon costs settlement till the trade maturity (AFMA, 2012). 
Since financial products with the same conditions are supposed to have equal price in 
an efficient market (Malkiel & Fama, 1970), the different ways of incorporating carbon 
component on the ETD and OTC electricity derivative markets should lead to a 
difference in price between these two groups of electricity derivatives, which were 
based on the identical underlying electricity demand and trade duration. The price 
spread could be recognized as an implied carbon price, which reveals the market 
expectation of carbon price. 
Besides the correlation between markets for carbon permits and other financial markets, 
carbon pricing also influence the stock price of those energy companies in the electric 
utility sector. Previous studies on the European carbon market discovered that prices of 
EU Allowance (EUA) and EUA futures tend to respond negatively to the shocks from 
financial and commodity markets (Chevallier, 2009, 2011b). Due to the effect of carbon 
pricing in constraining emissions of the European electricity sector (Fezzi & Bunn, 
2009; Kirat & Ahamada, 2011), there have been concerns over the impact of carbon 
costs on the profitability of electric utility companies. However, Oberndorfer (2009) 
and Veith et al. (2009) observed a high carbon pass-through rate on the European 
market, so that costs of carbon were passed to the consumers through higher electricity 
wholesale price. As a result, electric utility companies achieved greater revenue, which 
positively affected their stock prices. In Australia, as carbon price was in tax form 
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throughout its effectiveness till July 2014, it was supposed that carbon costs were 
passed directly from generators and retailers to the electricity end-users. However, 
recent study showed that the actual carbon pass-through rate in major Australian states 
was higher than 100% (Nazifi, 2016). Hence, it is expected that electric utility 
companies made windfall profit, which could boost their revenue and stock 
performance. This motivated the current study to explore the influence of carbon 
pricing on Australian stock market. 
Furthermore, previous studies also discovered the existence of joint movement of price 
volatility in the market for carbon permits and the stock market. Feng et al. (2011) 
observed that price of the EU ETS exhibited large scale of fluctuation. This price 
instability was mainly due to various compliance events and growing uncertainties 
regarding the post-Kyoto international agreements (Chevallier, 2011a). Furthermore, 
uncertainties related to the carbon pricing policy have induced price fluctuation on the 
European carbon markets, which consequently caused price variation in the European 
stock market (Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et al., 2009). Moreover, the volatility 
transmission between the European markets for carbon permits and the stock markets 
was only significant in the short run (Tian et al., 2012).   
Despite the exposure of Australian electricity sector to the CPM implementation, little 
attention has been given to the market expectation of carbon price and the effect of 
CPM on the stock price variability of electric utility companies. Making use of the 
different mechanisms to incorporate carbon costs on the ETD and OTC electricity 
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derivative markets, the current work aims to fill this research gap by deriving an implied 
carbon price, which uncovers the market valuation of carbon price. As controversies 
throughout the CPM implementation caused inconsistent outlook on the fate of carbon 
price (Jotzo et al., 2012), modelling implied carbon price contributes to the 
understanding on the dynamics of market expectation under the policy uncertainty. A 
subsequent one-step ahead out-of-sample forecasting is conducted, in order to validate 
the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model selection. 
Furthermore, previous works on the correlation between European carbon and stock 
markets motivate an investigation on the existence of such relationship between 
electricity market and stock market during the CPM implementation in Australia. A key 
interest of this study is whether stock price variability of electric utility companies listed 
on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) was influenced by the changing expectation 
of carbon price signalled by the electricity derivative market. To pursue this question, 
a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model is applied to model the joint volatility movement 
of implied carbon price and S&P/ASX 200 Utilities (AXUJ) index listed of the ASX, 
which is a composite index comprised of some leading Australian electric utility 
companies. In addition, impulse response analysis (IRA) reveals the magnitude of such 
influence. 
This paper is organized as follows: the next section introduces and derives the implied 
carbon price. The third section studies its dynamics with an ARCH model, followed by 
a one-step ahead out-of-sample forecasting. The fourth section applies the VAR model 
to test the volatility correlation between implied carbon price and AXUJ index. After 
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analysing the magnitude of joint volatility movement with impulse response analysis, 
the last section concludes.  
3.2 Implied Carbon Price as Market Expectation of Carbon Price 
On 1st July 2012, the CPM came into effect as Australia’s national climate change 
mitigation policy. Due to the weak public support, the CPM was accompanied by the 
policy uncertainty throughout its implementation, which induced inconsistent market 
expectations of carbon price and doubts about the fate of Australian climate change 
policy (Jotzo et al., 2012). As noted in Chapter 2, information contained in the 
electricity derivative prices can reflect the market expectation of carbon costs. Implied 
carbon price in this study was derived following the methodology described in Section 
2.2.2.4. It is the average of daily price differences between Quarterly Baseload 
Electricity Futures and the Daily Curve of OTC Quarterly Baseload Electricity Forward 
for NSW, QLD and VIC, which were procured from ASX Energy and provided by the 
AFMA.20 The data cover daily closing prices for electricity derivatives with non-zero 
trading volume from 3 December 2010 to 3 December 2013. As demonstrated in 
Section 2.4.6, the dynamics of implied carbon price reveals the continuous adjustment 
of market valuation about the costs of carbon as well as the anticipation on the fate of 
CPM.   
 
                                                            
20 The AFMA collects OTC financial product data independently from price contributors on daily basis. 
The daily curves are the daily average OTC electricity forward prices. 
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3.3 Modelling the Dynamics of Implied Carbon Price 
3.3.1 Motivation for Modelling Implied Carbon Price 
Modelling implied carbon price contributes to the evaluation of Australian carbon 
pricing policy. Throughout its implementation, CPM was associated with policy 
uncertainty. An econometric study could uncover the characteristics of implied carbon 
price, which reveals the market reaction to the relevant political and economic events. 
Furthermore, despite the policy controversy, the majority of Australian-based experts 
still expected that a carbon price would be in place before 2020 (Jotzo et al., 2012). 
Recent political progress achieved at the UNFCC Conference in Paris manifested the 
willingness to mitigate climate change effect through international cooperation. The 
commitment announced by the Australian government increased the possibility of a 
come-back of carbon price after the repeal of the CPM in July 2014 (Bamsey, 2015). 
Therefore, knowledge acquired through modelling implied carbon price contributes to 
the understanding on the dynamics of market expectation of carbon price, which is 
useful for future carbon market design and relevant risk management. 
3.3.2 ARCH Model 
As an emerging market-based policy instrument, carbon price often exhibits volatile 
movement (Feng et al., 2011). Since conventional econometric models that assume the 
disturbance term with constant variance are not able to capture the heteroscedasticity, 
Daskalakis et al. (2009), Benz & Trück (2009) and Paolella and Taschini (2008) applied 
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Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models to study 
the volatile price movement in the European carbon market. Due to the policy 
uncertainty, dynamics of implied carbon price followed a complex evolution process, 
which exhibited volatility clustering (Figure 3.1). Therefore, the ARCH model was 
chosen to study the movement characteristics of implied carbon price in Australia. 
Engle (1982) introduced the ARCH model to address the heteroscedasticity in 
conditional variance of time series. In an AR process of order p for yt: 
 0
1
p
t i t i t
i
y a a y 

     (3.1) 
, where 0a  denotes the constant term, ia  is the coefficient and tu  represents the error 
term, the conditional variance ht of the error term ut  is in form of a weighted sum of 
squared preceding observations:  
 2 2 2 20 1 2 2 3 3t t t t i t qh                   (3.2) 
, where t  are identical independent distributed (i.i.d.) variables with zero mean and 
finite variance. Imposing independent variable t  in an autoregressive form helps to 
achieve better prediction of the volatility. Consequently, the conditional variance of the 
error term ht is dependent on the realization of t i  . In case of positive serial correlation, 
a large (small) magnitude of t i   tends to be followed by the large (small) successive 
values. The AR-ARCH model was estimated with maximum likelihood technique. 
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3.3.3 Data 
Daily implied carbon price from 3 December 2010 to 3 December 2012 was employed 
as training dataset for model calibration, whereas data from 4 December 2012 to 3 
December 2013 were held out as out-of-sample dataset for validation purpose (Figure 
3.1 and Table 3.1).21 Due to the large scale of variation, both datasets depict high 
standard deviation and kurtosis. According to the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
statistics, the in-sample and out-of-sample datasets are characterized with unit root 
processes. Therefore, model estimation proceeded with the first-order differenced data, 
which eliminated the non-stationarity (Table 3.1). 
                                                            
21 In the econometrical time series study, data are usually separated into subsets for different purposes. 
While the in-sample dataset is used to estimate model parameters, the out-of-sample dataset is withheld 
from the model calibration process. It is used to compare with the values forecasted by the estimated 
model, in order to validate the model selection and to evaluate model’s forecasting performance (Brooks, 
2014). 
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3.3.4 Modelling the Dynamics of Implied Carbon Price  
The modelling procedure commenced with the selection of an appropriate AR model, 
which followed the Box-Jenkins methodology. According to the results of ACF and 
PACF analysis, there was significant autocorrelation in the first two lags. While the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) suggested AR(2) model, AR(1) model was 
considered to be superior according to the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Table 
3.2). Furthermore, as the estimated constant term was not significantly different from 
zero, the more parsimonious AR(1) model without constant term was preferred.  
Autocorrelation in the squared residuals after AR(1) model calibration for implied 
carbon price required further ARCH modelling. While the Ljung-Box test detected no 
significant autocorrelation in the AR(1) residuals (Table 3.2), rejection of the null 
hypothesis for the squared AR(1) residuals indicated a non-constant variance. 
Moreover, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM)-ARCH Effect test (Engle, 1982) 
demonstrated that the heteroscedasticity in the AR(1) residuals was significant (Table 
3.3). Therefore, conditional heteroscedastic errors following the normal distribution 
was integrated into the AR(1) model. Given the constraint on the non-negative 
conditional variance ht assumed by the ARCH process (Equation 3.2) (Enders, 2008), 
ARCH(2) and ARCH(3) models were abandoned due to the negative coefficient on the 
second lag (Table 3.2). Hence, AR(1)-ARCH(1) model was the appropriate model to 
capture the dynamics of implied carbon price. 
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Table 3.3: LM test for ARCH Effect 
 AR(1) Residuals  AR(1)-ARCH(1) Residuals 
Lags χ૛ df ࡼ > χ૛  χ૛ df ࡼ > χ૛ 
1 3.836 1 0.0501  0.319 1 0.5724 
2 9.897 2 0.0071  0.463 2 0.7935 
3 11.764 3 0.0082  0.472 3 0.9250 
4 11.777 4 0.0191  0.627 4 0.9600 
5 11.932 5 0.0357  0.669 5 0.9846 
6 13.972 6 0.0300  0.706 6 0.9944 
7 14.997 7 0.0360  0.768 7 0.9978 
8 19.727 8 0.0114  0.848 8 0.9990 
9 19.706 9 0.0198  1.028 9 0.9994 
10 21.668 10 0.0169  1.241 10 0.9995 
  The null hypothesis of test assumes no ARCH effect among the residuals.
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3.3.5 Empirical Results  
Estimating the mean and conditional variance equations for AR(1)-ARCH(1) model 
yielded 
 1
2
1
0.1616
0.0299
t t t
t t
y y
h




  

 
  (3.3) 
, where ty  denotes the first-order difference of implied carbon price, t  represents 
the error term, and ht is the conditional variance of the error term t , which is in form 
of a weighted sum of squared preceding observation t . The AR coefficient of -0.1616 
satisfied the stability condition 1 1a   for autoregressive process and had a low 
standard error of 0.0711. The ARCH coefficient of 0.0299 implied a stationary process 
with low amount of persistence, which was also associated with a low standard error of 
0.0233. Since the AR coefficient indicated a negative correlation within the in-sample 
dataset of implied carbon price, the upward trend was mostly due to the volatility 
clustering.  
ARCH model could capture the volatility clustering in the dynamics of implied carbon 
price. Besides the insignificant autocorrelation among the residuals of AR(1)-ARCH(1) 
model (Table 3.2), there were no more significant heteroscedasticity in the residuals 
according to the LM-ARCH effect test results either (Table 3.3). Furthermore, 
integrating ARCH term into the AR model improved the modelling results. As lower 
value of Information Criterion indicates better model estimation results, the decline of 
AIC value was contributed by the point estimate of conditional variance equation ht. 
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Since BIC has a stronger penalty term for additional parameters (Kuha, 2004), it 
increased as a result of extra parameters due to incorporating ARCH term into the AR(1) 
model. However, the BIC of AR(1)-ARCH(1) model was still the lowest among all 
models under consideration. 
3.3.6 Model Validation with Out-of-Sample Forecasting 
For the model validation purpose, results of one-step ahead forecasting for the period 
between 4 December 2012 and 3 December 2013 were compared with the out-of-
sample dataset. Updating AR(1)-ARCH(1) model with the estimated parameters by one 
period yielded the one-step ahead forecast conditioned on the information available at 
period t: 
 1 1 , 1, , 1,( | )t t t t t t tE y E y y y              (3.4) 
, where ܧ௧∆ݕ௧ାଵ is the conditional expectation of ty  (Enders, 2008). Since AR(1)-
ARCH(1) modelling was based on the first-order differenced data, the one-step ahead 
forecasting results were then converted to the forecasted implied carbon price: 
 1 1t t t t tEy y E y      (3.5)  
Thus, the forward iterative process, which started from the final observation of the in-
sample dataset, generated the out-of-sample point forecasting results for implied carbon 
price.  
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Furthermore, a comparison of forecasting results with alternative models validates the 
capability of AR(1)-ARCH(1) model in predicting implied carbon price. Therefore, 
one-step ahead forecasting was also carried out with random walk model based on the 
out-of-sample dataset, which can be expressed as: 
 1 1
2(0, )
t t t
t
Ey y
N

 
  

   (3.6) 
, where Eݕ௧ାଵ denotes the one-step ahead forecast of implied carbon price at t+1, ߝ௧ାଵ 
represents the random walk process following I.I.D. normal distribution with zero mean 
and variance of ߪଶ. It assumed that the best estimate of implied carbon price at t+1 is 
the previous price at time t adjusted by a drift following the Gaussian process.  
As the benchmark, random walk model demonstrated the advantage of AR(1)-ARCH(1) 
model in performing out-of-sample forecasting for implied carbon price. Visual 
observation suggested that both AR(1)-ARCH(1) model and random walk model 
delivered forecasting outcomes in good quality for the out-of-sample period (Figure 
3.2). However, it is also obvious that results from random walk models showed greater 
extent of deviations from the actual path of implied carbon price. This indicates that 
AR(1)-ARCH(1) model outwitted the random walk model with forecasting 
performance. To judge the exact forecasting quality, further evaluations from 
quantitative perspective are needed.  
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To articulate the quantitative forecasting performance measurement, forecast error at 
time t was computed:  
 1 1( ) t t te t Ey y     (3.7) 
, where e(t) is the difference between the forecasted value 1t tEy  and the out-of-sample 
data 1ty  . Subsequently, the mean absolute error (MAE) and the root mean square error 
(RMSE) were derived as: 
 
1
1 | ( ) |
n
i
MAE e t
n 
    
   (3.8) 
 
1
2 2
1
1 | ( ) |
n
i
RMSE e t
n 
 
  
  
   (3.9) 
, which evaluated the forecasting performance (Willmott & Matsuura, 2005). A glance 
at MAE and RMSE clearly shows the advantages of AR(1)-ARCH(1) model in out-of-
sample forecasting performance (Table 3.4). In comparison to other two random walk 
simulations, AR(1)-ARCH(1) model with the estimated parameters achieved the lowest 
MAE and RMSE. Considering the price scale of implied carbon price, which varied 
between 0 and $20/MWh, the MAE indicates that forecast errors were rather small. 
Furthermore, because of its sensitivity to the outliers among forecast errors (Hyndman 
& Koehler, 2006), the RMSE implies large scale of variation in the out-of-sample 
dataset due to the data dispersion. This could be explained by the data properties and 
the course of out-of-sample data (Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2), which is also clear evidence 
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for high variation of implied carbon price. The fluctuation reflects the varying market 
expectation of carbon price due to the policy uncertainty observed in Figure 3.1. Overall, 
AR(1)-ARCH(1) model outperformed random walk models in terms of out-of-sample 
forecasting for implied carbon price.  
Table 3.4: A Comparison of MAE and RMSE for One-Step Ahead Forecasting results 
from different Models   
 MAE RMSE 
AR(1)-ARCH(1) 0.5468 0.8997 
Random Walk Model I 0.8315 1.0431 
Random Walk Model III 0.8513 1.0506 
 
3.4 The Effect of Market Expectation of Carbon Price on the Stock 
Price Variability of Energy Companies in the Electric Utility Sector 
Recent studies discovered the effects of carbon pricing on the stock market. In Europe, 
the wholesale electricity price increased as a result of high carbon pass-through rate, 
which in turn positively affected the revenue of electricity companies and their stock 
prices (Oberndorfer, 2009 and Veith et al., 2009). Furthermore, volatility in the 
European carbon market also affected short-term stock price variability for the 
electricity companies (Tian et al., 2012). However, not enough attention has been given 
to the relationship between Australian carbon pricing policy implementation and the 
stock price variability. Moreover, seeing the dynamics of implied carbon price due to 
policy uncertainty (Figure 3.1), this study aims to evaluate the influence of market 
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expectation of carbon price on the stock price variability of electricity companies. This 
section looks into the volatility co-movement between implied carbon price and the 
stock price of electric utility companies during the implementation of CPM. 
3.4.1 VAR Model 
The Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model is a popular econometric tool to capture the 
interdependencies between time series. It includes an equation for each variable 
explaining its evolution with own lags and lags of other variables, so that all variables 
are symmetrically treated as endogenous. Comparing to the “incredible identification 
restrictions” in other structural models, the VAR model is a theory-free method for 
detecting economic relationships (Sims, 1986). This feature has been applied to study 
the interaction between the energy and stock markets (Chang et al., 2013; Olson et al., 
2014; Sadorsky, 1999; Shaharudin et al., 2009). Furthermore, the VAR model is also a 
popular method to explore the policy effect of carbon pricing policy on the stock market 
and the wider economy (Chevallier, 2011b; Fezzi & Bunn, 2009; Kumar et al., 2012; 
Oberndorfer, 2009).  
VAR model is a system of equations, which treats all variables symmetrically as 
endogenous. Consider a bivariate first-order VAR system: 
 10 12 11 1 12 1
20 21 21 1 22 1
t t t t yt
t t t t zt
y b b z y z
z b b y z y
  
  
 
 
    
    
   (3.10) 
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, where y and z denote endogenous variables, bi0 are the 1k   vectors of constant term, 
ijb and ij  indicate the 1k   vectors of coefficients. yt  and zt  are the 1k   vectors 
of uncorrelated white-noise disturbances for endogenous variables at time t. In addition 
to the autocorrelation feature, this linear function system incorporates the feedback 
effect between variables. Thus, ijb  represents the contemporaneous effect from other 
variables and ij  is the parameter that captures the past effects. The time path of one 
variable could be affected by the past and current realizations of other variables. In case 
of a nonzero
21b , the pure innovation y t  would have an indirect contemporaneous 
effect on tz (Enders, 2008). The standard form of the VAR model of order p could be 
generalized as: 
 0 1 1
(0, )
t t p t p t
t
Y A A Y A Y e
e N
     



  (3.11) 
, where tY  contains 1k   variables and t iY   are lagged dependent variables, and te  
represents the error term of the VAR (p) model, which is a composite of shocks of 
variables t (Appendix B). It is assumed that  
 
'
0
0
t
t t i
t t
Ee
Ee e
Ee e




  (3.12) 
, where  is the contemporaneous covariance matrix of errors:  
 
1 1 , 2
1 , 2 2
var( ) cov( )
cov( ) var( )
t t t
t t t
e e e
e e e
 
  
 
    
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3.4.2 Volatilities of S&P/ASX 200 Utilities (AXUJ) Index and Implied 
Carbon Price  
The S&P/ASX 200 Utilities (AXUJ) index (Figure 3.3) represents the stock price of 
Australian energy companies in the electric utility sector. It incorporates the major 
companies on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) that are involved in electric, 
gas and multi utility services (Table 3.4). All constituent companies have businesses 
related to electricity generation, retail and distribution except the APA Group.22 Based 
on the market capitalization, companies that provide electricity utility service make up 
the majority of AXUJ index (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2016; The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 2016). Since these companies were heavily exposed to the carbon pricing policy, 
AXUJ index was used as a proxy for the stock price of the Australian electricity utility 
sector during the implementation of CPM. The AXUJ index dataset collected from the 
SIRCA covers the period from 3 December 2010 to 3 December 2013 with daily 
observations.23 
In order to study the volatility co-movement, variances of implied carbon price and 
AXUJ index between 3 December 2010 and 3 December 2013 were derived (Figure 
3.3). The derivation of volatilities for AXUJ index was based on the 30-minute interval 
market data collected from SIRCA database and was calculated as:  
                                                            
22 In March 2016, APA Group acquired the 100% ownership of gas-powered stations in Queensland from 
AGL Energy Limited (APA Group, 2016). Therefore, it becomes an electricity utility provider in the 
major Australian state as well.    
23 SIRCA is a research data provider aiming at promoting and enabling financial research and innovation. 
It is an independent institute constituted by member universities, central banks, regulators and public 
sector agencies. 
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                        ߪ௧ = ඩ
∑ ݓ௜(݌௜ − ݌௧)ଶே௜ୀଵ
(ܰ − 1)
ܰ ∑ ݓ௜
ே
௜ୀଵ
 , ݓℎ݁ݎ݁    ݌௧ =
∑ ݓ௜݌௜ே௜ୀଵ
∑ ݓ௜ே௜ୀଵ
                 (3.13) 
,where σ௧ denotes the volatility of day t, N represents the number of observation during 
the day t (N equals to 12, as there are 12 observations for trading hours of ASX from 
10 am to 16 pm within a business day). Pi denotes the level of AXUJ index observed in 
the time interval, which is weighted by w௜ , and ݌௧ is the daily average index level. As 
the index was observed on half-hourly interval, the weight w௜  was equal among all 
observed periods. According to the ADF test statistics, both dataset are stationary 
(Table 3.5). The overall correlation between the variances of implied carbon price and 
AXUJ index was -0.008. 
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Figure 3.3 Variances of Implied Carbon Price and S&P/ASX 200 Utilities (AXUJ) Index 
(03/12/2010 – 04/12/2013) 
AXUJ Index 
 
Variance of AXUJ Index 
 
Variance of Implied Carbon Price 
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3.4.3 Modelling the Joint Volatility Movement between Implied 
Carbon Price and AXUJ Index 
The VAR modelling commenced with the lag selection. While the final prediction error 
(FPE) and AIC suggested eight lags, the Hannan and Quinn information criterion 
(HQIC) was in favour of two lags (Table 3.6). In order to determine the appropriate lag, 
a likelihood ratio test was carried out (Sims, 1980) 
 2 8)(log | | log | |)T c  （   (3.14) 
, where T is the number of usable observations, c is the number of parameters estimated 
in each equation of the unrestricted system and log | |n  represents the determinant 
of n in form of natural logarithm. The likelihood ratio test statistics follows an 
asymptotic 2 distribution, whose degrees of freedom are equal to the number of 
restrictions in the system (Enders, 1984). The 2 statistic of 58.75 led to a rejection of 
restricted VAR (2) model at 1% significance level with six degrees of freedom. Lags 
that not significantly different from zero were further excluded from the VAR (8) model. 
According to the Lagrange multiplier test, there was no remaining autocorrelation 
among the residuals after the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) for VAR model 
calibration. Moreover, as all eigenvalues lied inside the unit circle, the VAR modelling 
results satisfied the stability condition (Figure 3.4). 
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Figure 3.4: Eigenvalue Check for VAR Modelling Stability 
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3.4.4 Empirical Results 
The VAR model detected positive volatility co-movement between implied carbon 
price and AXUJ Index. The Granger Causality test statistics were significant at 1% level 
for all estimated equations (Table 3.7), which implies that volatilities of implied carbon 
price and AXUJ index could be used to predict each other.  
Table 3.7: Summary of Granger Causality Test 
Equation Excluded χ૛ df ࡼ > χ૛ 
Implied Carbon Price AXUJ 20.00 8 0.01 
Implied Carbon Price ALL 20.00 8 0.01 
AXUJ Implied Carbon Price 20.93 8 0.01 
AXUJ ALL 20.93 8 0.01 
The null hypothesis of Granger Causality test assumes that the dependent variable does not Granger 
cause the independent variable. 
Furthermore, the estimated VAR coefficients indicated positive correlation between 
both variables (Table 3.8). Oberndorfer (2009) pointed out that floating price for carbon 
permit in the EU ETS made the actual carbon costs varying from time to time. As a 
substantial factor influencing electricity generation costs, EUA price positively affected 
the stock prices of European electricity companies despite the carbon costs pass-
through. As Australia imposed a fixed-rate carbon price, the market was able to predict 
its impact on electricity prices before carbon tax came into effect. However, due to the 
different model assumptions, studies prior to July 2012 delivered inconsistent 
predictions about the impact of CPM implementation on Australian electricity prices, 
which expected the carbon costs pass-through rate ranging between 0.17 and 3.93 
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(McLennan Magasanik Associates, 2008; Simshauser and Doan, 2009). The simulation 
conducted by the Australian Treasury Department (2011) estimated that electricity 
prices could rise by approximately $18/MWh in the first five years after carbon price 
imposition. In comparison, using a multi-area probabilistic dispatch algorithm, the 
Garnaut Report (2008) forecasted a greater extent of electricity price increase due to 
higher magnitude of carbon costs pass-through. Furthermore, studies based on the data 
collected one year after CPM implementation found out a relative high degree of carbon 
costs pass-through in the Australian electricity market (AER, 2013b; Nazifi, 2016). 
However, empirical results from VAR modelling indicated that volatility interaction 
between electricity derivative market and stock market was rather small (Table 3.8). 
This suggested that stock market already absorbed the impact of carbon pricing on 
Australian electric utility companies. Despite its influence on generation costs, fixed-
rate carbon price made the cost incremental effect transparent to the market participants 
(Tasman, 2008; Merz 2011). Therefore, they were able to predict compliance costs for 
electric companies and the magnitude of electricity price level uplift prior to the CPM 
implementation. As market was aware of the pass-through of carbon costs to electricity 
end-users, a limited effect on stock performance of electric utility companies due to 
carbon pricing was expected. Therefore, despite the positive relationship between the 
volatilities of implied carbon price and the AUXJ Index, the fluctuation caused by 
carbon pricing was rather small.  
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Table 3.8: VAR Modelling Results 
 
 
  
Equation: Implied Carbon Price 
Implied Carbon Price Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Lag 2 0.18 0.04 5.09 0.00 
Lag 3 0.11 0.04 3.06 0.00 
Lag 6 0.11 0.04 3.06 0.00 
Lag 7 0.12 0.03 3.35 0.00 
Lag 8 0.17 0.04 4.62 0.00 
AXUJ Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Lag 2 0.19 0.05 4.13 0 
Equation: AXUJ 
Implied Carbon Price Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Lag 1 0.05 0.02 2.09 0.04 
Lag 7 0.05 0.02 2.21 0.03 
Lag 8 0.05 0.02 2.24 0.03 
AXUJ Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Lag 1 0.08 0.04 2.22 0.03 
Lag 2 0.14 0.04 3.98 0.00 
Lag 3 0.11 0.04 3.11 0.00 
Lag 4 0.14 0.04 3.78 0.00 
Lag 5 0.13 0.04 3.66 0.00 
Lag 6 0.13 0.04 3.47 0.00 
Lag 8 0.08 0.04 2.2 0.03 
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Furthermore, the volatility correlation effect was asymmetric. According to the 
estimated equation for implied carbon price, the impact from AXUJ Index variability 
was only significant at the second lag (Table 3.8). The likely reason for this lagged 
volatility spill over from the stock market is the participant structure of the electricity 
derivative market. As the platform to manage variation of electricity price and demand, 
electricity generators and retailers are the major market players on the electricity 
derivative market (AER, 2015). For instance, other participants such as financial 
institutions contributed approximately 20% of the annual turnover on the OTC 
electricity derivative market since 2010, with an exception of approximately 50% in 
2011 (Figure 2.7). As a consequence, investors have limited market power in the 
electricity derivative market. Therefore, volatility in the stock market did not 
significantly impact the electricity derivative market. On the other hand, variability of 
implied carbon price affected AXUJ Index at the first lag. This indicates that fluctuating 
expectation of carbon price had contemporaneous effect on the stock market due to the 
feedback from investors on the electricity derivative market. The estimation results 
reveal that variability of implied carbon price was still affecting electricity stocks at the 
seventh and eighth lags.  
  
89 
 
3.4.5 Impulse Response Analysis 
An impulse response analysis (IRA) traces out the time path of one endogenous variable 
in the VAR system after the shock induced by another endogenous variables. In the 
context of this study, it visually reveals how implied carbon price responded to a one 
unit volatility increase in AXUJ index. To conduct an IRA, the impulse response 
function (IRF), which is the long-run multiplier derived from the vector moving average 
(VWA) form of the VAR model (Hamilton, 1994; Lütkepohl, 2005) (Appendix C), was 
plotted for twenty business days. The convergence condition of the IRF was satisfied 
because the estimated VAR model was stable as shown in the previous section (Figure 
3.4). Furthermore, there was no difference in impulse response between different 
orderings, as the Choleski decomposition delivered symmetric IRA outcomes.24 
Variability of implied carbon price caused quick and persistent volatility reaction in the 
stock market. One unit shock from implied carbon price induced a volatility increase of 
0.047 units for AXUJ index on the following day (Figure 3.5). After reversing to the 
level close to zero on the second period, it bounced back to 0.02 units on the third day 
and remained relative stable until the sixth period. On the seventh day, volatility of 
AXUJ index jumped to 0.07 units and stayed unchanged till the day after. It declined to 
0.048 units on the ninth day and kept steady until day twelve. From the thirteenth period 
till the fifteenth period, it gradually climbed up to 0.056 units. Changes in the 
                                                            
24 The Choleski decomposition is a classical approach to impose restriction on underidentified VAR 
system, in order to explore the impulse response. By constraining the contemporaneous effect from one 
variable to the other, the Choleski decomposition enables the IRA to trace out the reaction of the 
unconstrained variable to the shock caused by other endogenous variables. The ordering refers to the 
order of the contemporaneous effect constrain applied to the endogenous variables. 
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subsequent days were tiny until the end of forecasting period. The time path of IRF 
demonstrated changing volatility response in Australian stock market due to the shock 
from electricity derivative market. This implied that carbon pricing policy uncertainty 
was transferred from electricity financial market to the stock market, which in turn 
continuously affected the outlook on major electric utility companies. The persistent 
volatility level change for AXUJ index reflected market anxiety over the effect of 
carbon pricing policy uncertainty on the electric utility sector.  
On the other hand, IRA also demonstrated the volatility impact from Australian stock 
market to the electricity derivative market. Volatility of implied carbon price began to 
response with a jump of 0.195 units two days after one unit volatility shock from AXUJ 
index (Figure 3.5). Despite a reverse to 0.01 units on the following day, it rose again 
on the third day and reached 0.06 units on day four. Although volatility of implied 
carbon price slightly declined since then until day six, it started an upward trend since 
day seven again and reached 0.08 units on the eighth day. After a decrease to 0.07 units 
on day nine, it rose to 0.1 units on day ten. Although a decline brought the volatility 
back to 0.07 units on the following day, it bounced back to 0.08 units on day twelve. 
Since then, volatility for implied carbon price remained relative stable until the 
twentieth forecasting period.  
The path of IRF showed that volatility response of implied carbon price to a shock from 
stock market was delayed. However, magnitude of volatility reaction for implied carbon 
price to a one unit shock from stock market was four times higher than the effect of 
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implied carbon price had on AXUJ index in the first three days. Several reasons could 
possibly explain the reason of such asymmetric response. First, Australian carbon price 
was in tax form throughout its effectiveness. Therefore, effect of carbon costs was 
transparent and predictable for companies that involved in electricity business. As share 
prices reflect various information and overall market outlook on company’s business 
results, volatility shock from electricity derivative market due to uncertainty of carbon 
pricing policy had limited effect on the variability of AXUJ index. Second, as a specific 
platform for managing risks in electricity sector, the majority of participants in this 
market are electricity generators and retailors. As they are not much involved in the 
stock market trading activities, magnitude of joint volatility co-movement between 
electricity derivative market and stock market was low. However, as noted in Chapter 
2, there was evidence showing that financial intermediaries speculated on carbon price 
implementation in the electricity derivative market. Since policy uncertainty related to 
CPM can also induce share price variability for electric utility companies that listed on 
stock market, volatility could be not only transferred from stock market to electricity 
derivative market by financial intermediaries, but also magnified by their speculative 
activities. Overall, IRA depicted that volatility spill-over between both markets was 
limited in the long-term. 
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Figure 3.5: Time Path of Impulse Response Function 
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3.5 Conclusion 
In July 2012, the Australian government introduced Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) 
to regulate Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. Using the data from Australian 
electricity derivative markets (OTC and ETD), this study extracted an implied carbon 
price to represent the market expectations of carbon costs. Besides modelling its 
dynamics, this work also measured the volatility co-movement between the implied 
carbon price and the Utilities (AXUJ) index of the Australian Stock Exchange. The 
investigation aimed to explore whether sentiment of carbon pricing in the electricity 
market influenced the stock price variability of electricity companies listed in the 
Australian stock market.   
Despite the effect of climate change policy in constraining GHG emissions, concerns 
over its impact on the economy resulted in weak public support. As a consequence, 
doubts about the fate of CPM throughout its implementation caused inconsistent market 
expectations on the carbon price. As Australia’s major GHG emitter, electricity sector 
was highly exposed to the carbon price. Due to the role of derivative market in 
managing electricity price variation, an implied carbon price derived from the prices of 
electricity derivative contracts could reveal the market expectation of carbon price. Its 
dynamics manifested that political and economic events caused unstable market 
anticipation. The volatility clustering induced by policy uncertainty could be captured 
and forecasted by Autoregressive (AR) model with conditional heteroscedastic error 
term. 
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Furthermore, Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model linked implied carbon price and 
S&P/ASX 200 Utilities (AXUJ) index, in order to test the price variability co-
movement between them. Due to the high carbon pass-through rate, pricing carbon 
enhanced the expected return of the private electric utility companies that listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange. As a result, there was positive price variability correlation 
between implied carbon price and AXUJ index, which was proved by the Granger-
Causality test.  
While variability of implied carbon price caused quick and persistent volatility reaction 
in the stock market, volatility transfer from stock market to the electricity derivative 
market was delayed. Volatility co-movement demonstrated the transfer of policy 
uncertainty from Australian electricity derivative market to stock market. The persistent 
volatility level shift reflected market concerns over the effect of carbon pricing policy 
uncertainty on the electric utility sector. Moreover, asymmetric response to volatility 
shock was found in both markets. Magnitude of volatility reaction for implied carbon 
price to a one unit shock from stock market was four times higher than the effect of 
implied carbon price had on AXUJ index in the first three days. This could be explained 
by predictable cost effect due to fixed-rate carbon price, participant structure of 
Australian electricity derivative market and speculative activities of financial 
intermediaries. Overall, the long term volatility spill-over between both markets was 
limited. 
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Despite the repeal of Carbon Pricing Mechanism, the majority of Australian-based 
experts still expect a comeback of the carbon price in the future. This study on the 
dynamics of implied carbon price extended the knowledge on the market expectation 
of carbon price under policy uncertainty. Furthermore, findings regarding the existence 
of volatility interaction between electricity derivative market and stock market could 
contribute to the risk management.   
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CHAPTER 4 
The Effect of Carbon Pricing Policy Uncertainty on 
Production and Abatement Investment  
4.1 Introduction 
Ecological and economic pressures from climate change have urged policy 
interventions in various forms around the world (IPCC, 2015). Under the traditional 
command-and-control regulation, emitters have to comply with technology and 
performance standards set by the policymaker. However, this uniform requirements 
usually lead to outcomes that are non-cost-effective (Aldy & Stavins, 2012). In 
comparison, regulated entities have more flexibility in choosing emission reduction 
methods under market-based environmental policy (Clarke, 2011). Theoretically, a 
price on emission, which is set equal to the marginal emission costs across all emitters, 
would economically encourage them to abate emissions or adopt low-pollution 
technologies (Metcalf, 2007). Plott (1983) observed that incentive-based instruments 
could internalize the negative externalities while significantly increasing the economic 
efficiency. Hence, carbon pricing is supposed to prompt long-term energy efficiency 
and economic growth (Humphreys, 2007; Rausch & Reilly, 2012). Therefore, market-
based policy instruments, such as carbon tax and cap-and-trade scheme, are favoured 
by economists and policymakers because of their flexibility and advantage in cost 
efficiency (Jeanrenaud, 2013).  
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The effect of market-based policy instruments in reducing GHG emissions and 
motivating investment in abatement technology has been intensively researched. 
Xepapadeas (2001) concluded that an optimal environmental policy design is 
achievable when it coincides with the social optimal economic outcome. However, 
firm's investment strategy is dependent on the compliance costs and the abatement 
capital (Saltari & Travaglini, 2011). Despite the increasing compliance costs due to 
pricing emissions, the Porter Hypothesis suggests that a proper environmental policy 
design and strict regulation would promote innovation, which may partially or fully 
offset the abatement costs (Porter & Van der Linde, 1995). Further evidence shows that 
policy certainty matters to the effect of market-based environmental policy. Fuss et al. 
(2008) found that emitters become reluctant with investment in emission abatement 
under an uncertain regulatory environment. Despite suffering from increasing expenses 
for emissions, they tend to postpone investment decisions until a clear message from 
regulator regarding the policy commitment. An expert survey conducted by Jotzo et al. 
(2012) demonstrated the effect of policy uncertainty on emission-saving technology 
investment in Australia. Results showed that uncertainty associated with carbon pricing 
policy caused substantial extra costs in Australia’s electricity sector. As a consequence 
of unclear future of carbon pricing policy, investors had to bear higher investment risk. 
Therefore, policy uncertainty not only delayed abatement decisions, but also limited the 
amount of investment.   
The current development of carbon market shows that implementation of market-based 
environmental policy is still associated with numerous uncertainties. Risk rooted in a 
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variety of aspects including public opinion, political attitude and economic view 
(Kossoy et. al., 2014; Quiggin, 2008; Whitmarsh, 2011). This is mostly due to the lack 
of public consensus about mitigation responsibility and the fear of economic impact 
despite scientific recognition about the trend of climate change (Painter, 2013; 
Whitmarsh, 2011). Thus, policymakers are easily influenced by the public opinion and 
large emitters such as the electricity industry (Spash & Lo, 2012). As a consequence, 
the current political commitment to the long-term climate change policy is shaking. For 
instance, the collapse of Australian carbon pricing policy illustrates that environmental 
policy is vulnerable even if it is endorsed by legislation framework. After introducing 
the Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) in July 2012 to impose a price on carbon 
emissions (Clean Energy Act, 2011), the newly elected Australian government 
terminated the framework in July 2014 (Department of the Environment, 2014). 
Moreover, Australia’s Renewable Energy Target has been cut by a quarter (ABC, 
2015b). Recently, the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC), which was set up to 
mobilize capital investment in renewable energy, low-emission technology and energy 
efficiency by the Australian Government in 2012, has been under the threat of 
abolishment (ABC, 2015a). 
The reversal of environmental policy in Australia motivates the current study regarding 
the effect of policy uncertainty on emitters’ production decisions and abatement 
investment. In comparison to other economic study methods, which rely on ex post 
market data, laboratory experiment has advantage in exploring the effects of emerging 
uncertainties on carbon market (Friesen & Gangadharan, 2013). Some experimental 
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studies simulated price uncertainty with a temporal unequal distribution or reduction of 
permits (Ben-David et. al., 2000; Cason et. al., 1999). Others looked into the effect of 
permit banking allowance on the price uncertainty (Cason & Gangadharan, 2006; 
Murphy & Stranlund, 2006, 2007). Furthermore, experimental studies showed that 
banking allowances in carbon market could reduce the hesitation in abatement 
investment caused by price uncertainty and increase market efficiency (Betz & 
Gunnthorsdottir, 2009). Although environmental policy is also facing challenge due to 
controversy, little attention has been given to the policy uncertainty and its consequence 
to the policy outcome. The object of this paper is to fill this research gap in the 
experimental study. 
The current study aims to uncover the effect of policy uncertainty on production and 
abatement investment decisions with a laboratory experiment. It looks explicitly into 
emitter’s decisions in production and investment in abatement technology when facing 
a possible policy termination. The experiment simulates a closed economy comprising 
of eight independent emitters, whose production activities generate income and release 
emissions. Under the policy framework, emissions induce compliance costs, which 
could be reduced through investment in abatement technology. However, a policy 
reversal, which is controlled by a computer-generated random probability, could 
terminate the regulation framework. Due to speculations on regulation commitment, it 
is expected that total number of technology upgrade under policy uncertainty is lower 
than optimum. Furthermore, because of investment hesitation, a large extent of decrease 
in expenditure for abatement technology upgrade is also expected once policy 
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uncertainty emerges. As regulation repeal removes the constraint on production 
activities, a greater amount of total emissions than under policy certainty is also 
anticipated. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section introduces the conceptual 
framework of the experiment, which is followed by the description of experimental 
design and procedure. After reporting and discussing the experiment results in the 
fourth section, the final section concludes.   
4.2 Conceptual Framework 
4.2.1 Regulation Framework 
Conceptual framework of this experimental study relied on the standard premises of 
environmental economics (Freeman III et al. 1973). The object is to curb emissions 
with the least social costs: 
          
min ( ) ( )i i
i
AC l DC L
 
            (4.1) 
, where li is the emission quantity by i-th emitter; L is the social aggregated emission 
quantity; ACi denotes the abatement costs of i-th emitter associated with the individual 
emission quantity li; and DC represents the environmental damage under the social 
aggregated emission quantity L. The aim of policy is to set a price on emission, so that 
the optimal emission level L* could be achieved with the minimum social aggregate 
costs. 
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4.2.2 Production and Abatement Investment 
This experiment simulated a closed economy that was comprised of independent 
emitters. Their production activities generated emissions, which induced compliance 
costs under the regulation framework. Emitters could reduce emissions through 
investment in abatement technology upgrade. The aim of emitters was to maximize 
individual profits: 
( , ) ( ) ( ) [ ( , )]i i i i i i i i i i iT q NR q IC T CC l T q      (4.2) 
, where i denotes emitters’ individual profit；Ti represents the current emission 
technology of the i-th emitter; qi is the production level chosen by the i-th emitter; NRi 
denotes the net revenue associated with the production level qi; ICi is the i-th emitter’s 
investment expenditure on emission abatement given the technology Ti; CCi denotes 
the compliance costs due to the emission amount li, under emission technology Ti and 
production level qi. Since regulation framework in this experiment imposes a fixed 
price on emissions, compliance costs CCi is the product of emission amount li, and tax 
rate t*. 
4.2.3 Optimal Response Strategy 
According to the experimental setup, there was an optimal response strategy regarding 
production and investment decisions for each emitter. While maximizing the individual 
profit i , emitter’s production activities generated emissions li, which induced 
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compliance costs CCi. Through investment in abatement technology upgrade, they 
could reduce individual emissions as well as the correspondent compliance costs. Given 
the cost characteristics, every emitter had an optimal response strategy by either 
investing in abatement technology or adjusting the production plan until the marginal 
costs of emission reduction match the tax rate t* (Table 4.1).  
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4.2.4 Policy Uncertainty 
Environmental policy is susceptible to political decisions, which could cause 
substantial amendment or even complete reversal.25 This lab experiment incorporated 
a specific mechanism to simulate such policy uncertainty, in that a random probability 
was generated by computer at the start of period to represent the likelihood of policy 
repeal. The regulation termination was determined by this random probability that 
followed the binomial distribution. Once the repeal occurs, the tax rate t* would switch 
to zero with immediate effect and remain so in the remaining periods of the round. 
Since the probability generation took place at the beginning of each period, the process 
ensured that the repeal probability for each period was independent. 
4.3 Experimental Design and Procedure 
4.3.1 Experimental Design 
This experiment simulated a closed economy comprised of eight independent emitters, 
whose production activities generated revenue and released GHG emissions. While the 
regulation framework imposed a fixed price on emissions, emitters could reduce 
compliance costs through investment in abatement technology upgrade. In order to 
maximize individual profit, emitters were motivated to adjust production and 
                                                            
25A particular example is the repeal of Australia's Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM). The policy became 
effective on 1 July 2012, and then became a controversial political topic during the election campaign in 
2013. The newly elected government finally abolished the price on carbon in July 2014 (Rootes, 2014). 
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investment plans according to their heterogeneous abatement costs and emission 
intensities (Table 4.1).  
Emission intensity in this experiment was defined as the amount of emission generated 
by per unit of net revenue. Hence, emitters were categorized into groups with different 
emission intensities. While Emitters 1, 2 and 3 were characterized with high emission 
intensity, Emitters 6, 7 and 8 were featured with low emission intensity. And emission 
intensity for Emitters 4 and 5 was defined as medium. The distinctive emission intensity 
endowment helped to study the effect of policy uncertainty on the decisions of emitters 
with different efficiencies. According to the experimental design, they were supposed 
to follow unique optimal abatement investment strategies based on their individual 
emission intensity and efficiency characteristics (Table 4.1). For instance, the emission 
intensities of Emitter 1, 2 and 3 would cause high compliance costs under the regulation, 
so that they were not able to attain positive net revenues even after full engagement of 
abatement technology upgrade. Therefore, it was economically not efficient for them 
to conduct any abatement investment during the experiment. Their optimal strategy was 
to cease production under the regulation. 
The experimental design was based on the tax-only treatment in Bernold et al. (2015). 
The basic setup such as input price, upgrade costs and emission intensities of individual 
emitters were held identical. However, this experiment innovated by incorporating a 
policy uncertainty treatment as described in Section 4.2.4. Therefore, in order to 
compare with the observation from uncertainty scenario in this study, results from 
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experiment done by Bernold et al. (2015) were used as certainty scenario. The 
experiment consisted of seven sessions in total, and each session contained four rounds 
with identical setup. Throughout the thirteen periods in each round, participants made 
production and investment decisions in a series of stages to maximize individual 
revenue (Figure 4.1). At the end of each round, a summary of individual performance 
for the past thirteen periods was displayed on participant’s own screen. After 
completing the session, participants received report regarding individual earnings 
followed by a questionnaire. 
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4.3.2 Experimental Procedure 
4.3.2.1 Subjects Recruitment  
The experiment was programmed in Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and carried out in the 
Behavioural Research Laboratory at The University of Sydney. Participant recruitment 
was processed through the ORSEE system (Greiner, 2004).26 Each recruited participant 
attended only one session of the experiment. At the beginning of each session, eight 
participants were assigned randomly as one of the emitter with unique characteristics. 
Their income in E$ during the experiment depended on individual performance. 
Furthermore, before the experiment start, they were informed regarding the exchange 
rate (AUD/E$), which ensured that they had opportunity to earn equivalent earnings 
(Table 4.1). In addition, they also received a show-up payment of 15 Australian Dollar 
(AUD) after the session completion. During the two-hour experimental session, 
individual earnings varied between 43 AUD and 46 AUD.27 
4.3.2.2 Instruction Stage 
At the beginning of each session, participants had ten minutes to read an instruction 
sheet, which described the experimental procedure (Appendix D). An instruction video, 
which contained snapshots from real experimental screens, was then played on the 
                                                            
26ORSEE is an online system for experiment subject recruitment. The system sends out invitation emails 
to the volunteers, who have registered their interests previously. As the number of subject in each session 
is limited, the recruitment follows a “first-come, first served” principle. 
27According to the "Average Weekly Earnings" survey by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), the 
average weekly earnings of all employees across Australia is 1,123 AUD, which is equivalent to 29.55 
AUD/hour with 38 weekly working hours (ABS, 2014). 
109 
 
display monitor.28  This video aimed at helping participants to familiarize with the 
experimental environment and providing them with visual examples. Subsequently, a 
quiz assisted participants to test their understandings (Appendix E). Throughout the 
entire experiment, neither introductory materials nor descriptions mentioned the 
particular context related to the environmental regulation. The term “input price” 
replaced compliance costs to decontextualize the concept.   
4.3.2.3 Production Stage 
Participants made production decisions to generate revenue in the production stage. 
They could choose any production level between 0 and 10, along which the net revenue 
increased proportionally. During the selection of production level in each period, the 
associated net revenue appeared on the screen as reference for participants (Row 1 in 
Table 4.1). At the same time, they could see the number of required inputs and the 
correspondent costs. Without investment to upgrade technology, each incremental 
production level required one unit of input. The input price was set at zero in the non-
liability stage (the first five periods of each round), and became E$ 16 in the liability 
stage (the rest eight periods of the round). Participants could produce as long as they 
had sufficient fund to cover the compliance costs. The experiment proceeded to the next 
stage, once all participants confirmed their selections or the time for production stage 
expired. 
                                                            
28The video instruction that based on the video recorded in (Bernold et al., 2015) could be viewed in: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8UdoCjbMTA&feature=youtu.be&noredirect=1 
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4.3.2.4 Investment Stage 
In the investment stage, participants could invest in abatement technology upgrade to 
reduce emissions generated by production activities. Starting from the second period in 
each round, participant had sixty seconds to make investment decisions for technology 
upgrade prior to the production stage. Each participant could undertake up to four 
upgrades within an experimental round. However, multiple upgrades in the same period 
were not possible. Each incremental upgrade investment lowered the input requirement 
by 10%. For instance, after the first investment, the required input for each production 
level decreased from 1 to 0.9. A further investment would reduce the input requirement 
to 0.8. After the investment decision, emission reduction became effective immediately 
and remained valid until the end of round. During the investment stage, a table of 
investment costs appeared on the screen for participants as reference. Balance was 
updated automatically once they confirmed the investment choice.  
Furthermore, the policy uncertainty emerged starting from the 10th Period of each 
round. According to the setup in Section 4.2.4, a computer-generated random 
probability represented the possibility of regulation termination. As the public 
information, this probability was disclosed to participants at the start of each period. 
Once the repeal occurred, the input price in the current period turned to zero 
immediately and would remain so until the end of round. 
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4.3.2.5 Performance Summary  
At the end of each period, participants could review individual performance on the 
screen. This summary included the number of required inputs, the input price, the 
expense for inputs and remaining balance. It also summarized the total number of 
investments committed by all participants but without disclosing the explicit number of 
individual upgrades. In addition, there was a performance summary at the round level 
after the completion of the 13th period. At the end, participants received report about 
their cash earnings according to their overall performance during the session. 
4.4 Results and Discussions 
This section summarizes and discusses the experimental results. Since this experiment 
differed to the tax-only treatment in Bernold et al. (2015) by incorporating a possible 
regulation repeal, observations in both experiments are compared to highlight the effect 
of policy uncertainty.  
4.4.1 Investment and Emission Reduction 
Imposing price on carbon emissions motivated early engagement in abatement 
technology upgrade. During the experiment, most upgrades took place in the early 
periods before the regulation enforcement started at the Period 6 (Figure 4.2). While 
Ben-David et al. (2000) observed that emitters adopt a "wait and see" approach for 
abatement investment under uncertainty, Fuss et al. (2008) discovered that price 
uncertainty motivates earlier investment in carbon-saving technology. However, both 
112 
 
studies concluded that investors tend to postpone the investment before a clear message 
from the policymaker indicating further commitment to the climate change policy. 
Since emitters in the experiment were aware of the commencing period of the regulation, 
the concentration of technology upgrade in the early periods revealed their early 
engagement aiming at the compliance costs mitigation (Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2: A Comparison of Average Number of Abatement Technology Upgrade between 
Experiment without Uncertainty (blue) and Experiment with Uncertainty (orange) by Period 
 
Overall, there was less investment in abatement technology upgrade under policy 
uncertainty. Throughout the entire experiment, thirteen out of twenty-eight rounds 
experienced policy termination, which approximately matched the 50% repeal rate set 
by the experimental design. Once regulation repeal occurred, the input price turned to 
zero, so that previous investment in technology upgrade became the sunk cost. 
Therefore, participants behaved differently with the technology upgrade decisions 
under policy certainty and uncertainty (Table 4.2). The number of technology upgrade 
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was on average 24% lower under uncertainty, which matched with hypothesis expected 
in Section 4.1. Moreover, the average number of technology upgrade by round kept 
decreasing throughout the experiment, which stabilized at the theoretical optimal level 
after Round 3 (Table 4.2). Due to participants’ overact tendency observed in the 
previous economic lab experiments (Bernold et al., 2015; Camacho-Cuena et al., 2012; 
Gangadharan & Nemes, 2005), the real accumulated abatement investment under 
policy uncertainty could be even lower than observed. Furthermore, the Wilcoxon–
Mann–Whitney test showed that the number of technology upgrade by period was 
statistically significant lower under policy uncertainty (one-tailed P<0.1%) (Figure 
4.2).29 However, the number of upgrade under uncertainty exceeded the amount of 
investment under certainty in Period 2 and 7 (Figure 4.2). These two exceptions 
emerged in the early period of non-liability and liability stages, when participants 
adjusted themselves to the experimental environment. This phenomenon and the trend 
observed by round demonstrated the learning process, through which participants 
gradually discovered their optimal investment strategy. 
 
 
 
                                                            
29The Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test is a rank-based nonparametric test, whose hypothesis assumes that 
two datasets follow the same distribution. It does not rely on the distributional assumption as many 
statistical tests. Therefore, it delivers powerful statistic results when the data follow a non-normal 
distribution. The test is carried out in SAS 9.3 (Cleophas & Zwinderman, 2011; Pappas & DePuy, 2004). 
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Less investment in technology upgrade under policy uncertainty led to a lower emission 
abatement. The Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test showed that the amount of emission 
abatement under uncertain policy environment became significantly lower (one-tailed 
P<5%). This was mostly due to the less investment committed by emitters with low 
emission intensity (Emitter 4 and 5), who were supposed to contribute the most 
emission abatement investment. They undertook on average 28% less investment for 
abatement technology upgrade than the theoretical optimal level (Figure 4.3). 30 
Therefore, the total abatement made by subjects was not sufficient to curb the real 
emission to the level set by policymaker. As a result of lower investment in abatement 
technology, emission abatement shrunk round by round and fell below the policy target 
after Round 3 under uncertainty (Table 4.2). 
  
                                                            
30 The entire experiment consisted of seven independent sessions. For each session, eight subjects were 
recruited as independent emitters. Unique efficiencies were attributed to them randomly, so that they 
made rational decisions based on their emitter types. An overview of average number of abatement 
technology upgrade on subject level highlights the effect of policy uncertainty on each type of emitter. 
A follow-up fixed-effect regression in Section 4.4.2 indicated that the differences between each round 
were statistically insignificant.  
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Figure 4.3: A Comparison of Average Number of Abatement Technology Upgrade between 
Experiment without Uncertainty (blue) and Experiment with Uncertainty (orange) by Subject 
 
4.4.2 Regression Analysis on Investment Behaviour under Policy 
Uncertainty 
A regression analysis with mixed-effect model was carried out to look into the impact 
of policy uncertainty on investment in abatement technology upgrade. The results 
address the effect of policy uncertainty from empirical perspective. The dependent 
variable was emitters’ expenditure for technology upgrade investment (in E$) in each 
round. Emitters were classified into groups with different emission intensities 
according to the experimental setup in Section 4.3.1. These categorical dummy 
variables that represent the classification of emission intensity group served as 
dependent variables. Furthermore, additional dummy variables helped to distinguish 
between investment decisions under certainty and uncertainty. Due to the possible 
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variation of individual choices across time, the order of conducted experimental round 
(e.g. Round 1, 2, 3 and 4) was selected as random-effect explanatory variable. 
The regression results revealed the negative effect of policy uncertainty on investment 
for abatement technology upgrade. Under the uncertainty, there was an obvious decline 
in investment expenditure for all emitter groups (Table 4.3). Although emitters with 
low intensity were set as the most efficient group to conduct technology upgrade 
according to the experimental design, the decrease of their expenditures for abatement 
investment was much higher than others when there was possible regulation repeal. 
This implies that efficient emitters became reluctant in upgrading abatement technology 
due to the policy uncertainty. The regression results showed that expenditure for 
investment in abatement technology upgrade by all emitters decreased by 
approximately 36% under policy uncertainty. Previous empirical study also discovered 
that a 10% increase in policy uncertainty would cause 1.2-2.8% decrease in public 
investment for abatement technology innovation (Kalamova et al., 2013). Although 
participants’ individual decisions might change by round due to learning effect, the 
coefficient showed that this kind of random effect was very limited (Round variable in 
Table 4.3). The regression results converged with the maximum likelihood estimation. 
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Table 4.3: Regression Results 
(Dependent Variable: Expenditure of Upgrade Investment in Round) 
 Estimated Coefficients 
Certainty  
Emitter with High Intensity 294.8333** 
 (31.2402) 
Emitter with Medium Intensity 309.75** 
 (25.5076) 
Emitter with Low Intensity 219.625** 
 (25.5076) 
Uncertainty   
Emitter with High Intensity 204.0179** 
  (28.9228) 
Emitter with Medium Intensity 245.2381** 
  (23.6154) 
Emitter with Low Intensity 80.9388** 
 (23.6154) 
Round 4.79e-17* 
Constant 4.39e-17* 
Log Likelihood -2827.2384 
n 416 
ܲ > χଶ 0.0002 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*indicates significance at 5% level. 
**indicates significance at 1% level. 
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4.4.3 Production and Emission 
Policy uncertainty caused fluctuating production activity and difficulty to constrain 
total emissions. After its enforcement, regulation framework effectively constrained the 
production activity. As evidence, production level declined dramatically starting from 
Period 6 (Figure 4.4). However, there was an obvious rebound in production once the 
policy uncertainty emerged starting at Period 10. Between Period 10 and 13, production 
level increased by 26% (Figure 4.4).  
The production level rebound and the less abatement upgrade observed in Section 4.4.1 
suggested that policy uncertainty led to temporal production reduction rather than 
investment in abatement technology upgrade. Due to the uncertain policy environment, 
abatement investment became the sunk costs once regulation was terminated. While 
expenditure for abatement technology upgrade is irreversible, production level can be 
adjusted by emitters in each period. Hence, efficient emitters could avoid such risk by 
only lowering production level to reduce compliance costs and increasing the 
production level after the occurrence of policy repeal. Therefore, policy uncertainty 
resulted in a shift from abatement investment to temporal production adjustment. As a 
consequence, emitters with high investment efficiency (Emitter 4 and 5) cut their 
expenditures for technology upgrade. The cumulative production exceeded the 
optimum level, as emitters produced with full capacity again once the policy repeal 
removed the constraint on emissions (Table 4.2). The overall outcome of emitters’ 
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decisions in production and abatement investment was in accordance with the 
expectation hypothesized in Section 4.1.  
Further comparison showed that emitters undertook more production activities under 
policy uncertainty. The Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test results indicated that production 
level was significantly higher (one-tailed P<5%) when policy uncertainty was in place. 
This increase was due to the excess production by emitters with high emission intensity 
(Emitter 1, 2 and 3), who produced more than the optimum in contrast to other groups 
(Figure 4.5). Their total production was 17% higher than that without policy uncertainty. 
Due to the higher production and less investment in abatement technology, emissions 
exceeded the optimum level in all rounds except the first one (Table 4.2). According to 
the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test results, emitters released greater amount of emission 
under policy uncertainty (one-tailed P<0.5%), which was 11% higher than that under 
policy certainty. Hence, regulation repeal released the production capacity that curbed 
by the regulation. The fluctuation of production made it difficult to constrain total 
emissions below the policy target.  
12
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 4.5 Conclusion 
This experimental study aimed to investigate the effect of policy uncertainty on emitters’ 
production decision and abatement investment, which was motivated by the repeal of 
Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM). The experiment simulated a closed 
economy comprised of eight independent emitters, whose production activities 
generated revenue and released emissions. While regulation framework imposed a 
fixed price on emissions, emitters could reduce compliance costs through investment 
in abatement technology upgrade. Given their characteristics regarding costs and 
emission intensity, emitters were motivated to adjust production and investment plans, 
in order to maximize individual profit. Furthermore, the experiment simulated policy 
uncertainty by incorporating a computer-generated random probability, which 
determined the occurrence of regulation termination. The fixed-rate price on emissions 
became zero after the activation of repeal.   
Under the policy uncertainty, emitters became less motivated to upgrade abatement 
technology. Despite the concentration of abatement investment in the early periods, 
there was rarely further technology upgrade after policy uncertainty emerged. 
Moreover, as a result of declined overall investment, emitters conducted less emission 
abatement than expected. Furthermore, policy uncertainty induced fluctuating 
production activities and caused difficulty to constrain the total emissions. Despite an 
effective emission reduction after policy enforcement, emitters increased production 
once regulation framework was repealed. As there was no more concern over the 
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compliance costs, emitters with high emission intensity restarted to produce and emit. 
The removal of regulation framework also caused decreasing compliance costs, which 
implied shrinking government revenue. This potential fiscal constraint could impact the 
shift to the low emission economy. 
The increasing threats from climate change have initiated policy interventions around 
the world in recent years. However, public attitude towards the environmental policy is 
still controversial. As policymakers are easily influenced by the public attitudes, the 
policy framework is associated with considerable uncertainty. Reversal of CPM in 
Australia illustrates that environmental policy can be vulnerable even if it is endorsed 
by the legislation framework. Policy uncertainty induces speculation on the continuity 
of regulation, which consequently undermines the long-term policy outcomes and 
weakened the willingness for abatement investment. However, policy stability and 
predictability are crucial for emitters to make rational abatement investment decisions. 
While political decisions that attempt to echo public doubts about the climate change 
policy creates merely temporal economic and political benefits, compliance to the 
policy commitment is important for the effect and credibility of carbon pricing policy. 
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CHAPTER 5  
Summary and Conclusion 
In response to the threats from climate change, the Australian Government introduced 
Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) to regulate Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions in 
July 2012. Due to its heavy reliance on fossil fuels, the electricity industry was exposed 
to this carbon pricing policy. This thesis studied the effect of CPM implementation on 
Australian electricity sector. 
5.1 Review of Research 
Chapter 2 evaluated the effect of CPM on Australian electricity spot and derivative 
markets. It looked into the changes of electricity price and volatility since the policy 
implementation. As a contribution to the evaluation of Australian carbon pricing policy, 
the study extended research scope to the electricity derivative market. By distinguishing 
between the exchange-traded (ETD) and over-the-counter (OTC) markets, it examined 
the differential effects manifested within the market for electricity derivative contracts. 
Given that the carbon price was explicitly incorporated into the ETD contracts, whereas 
this was not the case for the OTC contracts, the price of the latter could be termed as 
“carbon-clean”. This enabled the derivation of an implied carbon price as a price spread 
between the ETD and OTC derivative contracts of the same class. It can be used to 
draw inference about market participants’ expectations regarding the fate of CPM, 
which was politically contested throughout its implementation. Furthermore, besides 
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price transition in the electricity derivative market, other characteristics such as 
turnover, liquidity and speculation were also reviewed. 
Chapter 3 further studied the dynamics of implied carbon price and its volatility co-
movement with the stock price of energy companies in the electric utility sector. 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model was applied to capture 
the movement characteristics of implied carbon price under the policy uncertainty. 
Furthermore, Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model linked implied carbon price with 
S&P/ASX 200 Utilities (AXUJ) index of Australian Stock Exchange, in order to test 
the existence of joint volatility movement.   
Throughout its life until July 2014, CPM was accompanied by policy controversies. 
Chapter 4 is a laboratory experiment, which was designed to study the effect of policy 
uncertainty on production decisions and abatement investment. The experiment 
consisted of eight emitters, whose production activities generated revenue and released 
emissions. While the regulation imposed a fixed price on emissions, emitters could 
reduce compliance costs through investment in abatement technology upgrade. Given 
their costs and emission intensity characteristics, emitters were motivated to adjust 
production and investment plans, in order to maximize individual profit. Furthermore, 
the experiment incorporated policy uncertainty, in that emitters faced the possible 
regulation repeal controlled by a computer-generated random probability.  
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5.2 Summary of Results 
Addressing the research aims outlined in Chapter 1, the main findings of the study can 
be summarized as follows:  
1. To evaluate the changes in electricity spot and derivative markets that can be 
attributed to the CPM implementation.  
As a result of CPM implementation, price level increased in both electricity spot and 
derivative markets. Different emission intensities across Australian states led to 
inconsistent magnitudes of price adjustment in the spot electricity. In contrast to the 
abrupt increase of spot electricity price, price transition in the electricity derivative 
market was smoother. However, since carbon costs settlement for OTC derivative 
contracts was postponed to the trade maturity, the exchange-traded (ETD) and the over-
the-counter (OTC) derivative markets demonstrated different price transition 
characteristics.  
Further analysis showed that CPM implementation was not the major cause for 
volatility adjustment in the electricity markets. In addition, speculative opportunities 
induced by the CPM implementation motivated greater engagement of financial 
intermediaries in the electricity derivative market, which then significantly improved 
the market liquidity. Active involvement of financial institutions also stimulated the 
development of electricity derivative market. As a result, there was a diversification of 
product categories in Australian electricity derivative market.  
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2. To study the market expectation on carbon price, since the CPM was politically 
contested throughout its implementation.    
As the message extracted from the electricity derivative price, dynamics of implied 
carbon price manifested the market sentiment to the carbon pricing policy. The implied 
carbon price revealed that market expectation of carbon price was influenced by various 
political and economic events. As it conveyed information reflecting the market 
anticipation about the fate of the CPM, its course continuously adjusted throughout the 
CPM implementation. Modelling results showed that Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model could capture the dynamics of implied carbon price.  
3. To test whether the market expectation of carbon price signaled by the 
electricity derivative market influenced the stock price volatility of electricity 
companies. 
Despite the evidence of positive volatility correlation, perception of policy uncertainty 
in the electricity derivative market did not significantly influence the stock price 
variability of electric utility companies. On the other hand, volatility variation in the 
stock market had little impact on implied carbon price. This could be explained by the 
unique participant structure in the electricity derivative market, where electricity 
generators and retailers have dominant market power. Due to the business focus, their 
exposure to the stock market is limited. Therefore, exogenous shocks from financial 
markets had finite impact on the electricity derivative market. 
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4. To study the effects of policy uncertainty on production decisions and 
investment for abatement technology.      
Results of experimental study demonstrated the negative effect of policy uncertainty on 
emission regulation and abatement technology investment. During the lab experiment, 
which incorporated random policy repeal to simulate the unstable policy environment, 
emitters became less motivated for investment in abatement technology upgrade. 
Economic analysis showed that the overall expenditure for abatement technology 
upgrade decreased by approximately 36%. Moreover, emitters started to raise 
production levels once the regulation framework was terminated. As a consequence, it 
became difficult to constrain the total emissions under the policy uncertainty. 
5.3 Conclusion 
Climate change has become a major challenge to the human society in the 21st Century. 
Pricing carbon emission is a direct way to deal with this global environmental issue. 
Studies in this thesis demonstrated the effect of CPM implementation on Australian 
electricity sector. Based on the findings of the study, following conclusions could be 
drawn: 
1. Carbon pricing is an effective way to curb GHG emissions of the electricity 
industry. A price on carbon directly increased electricity generation costs. As a 
consequence, higher electricity price could indirectly constrain the electricity 
demand as well as the GHG emissions. Furthermore, emitters are given 
flexibility to choose the way of reducing emissions under the market-based 
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policy framework. Since carbon pricing was based on individual emission 
quantity and intensity, emitters were motivated to either directly abate 
emissions or adopt low-emitting technology. In comparison to the traditional 
command-and-control regulation, which set technology and performance 
standards to all regulated entities, emitters could achieve emission reduction in 
a cost-effective way under the carbon pricing scheme.  
 
2. The price risk induced by carbon pricing could be hedged with a functional 
derivative market. In comparison to the abrupt price increase in the electricity 
spot market, price transition process in the market for electricity derivative 
contracts was smooth. This phenomenon illustrated the ability of electricity 
derivative market in absorbing carbon price risk. Furthermore, there were 
different ways to include carbon costs on the electricity derivative market, so 
that emitters had more options to hedge exposures to the carbon pricing policy. 
While carbon component was priced into the ETD electricity derivative 
contracts, trading parties of the OTC derivative contracts were allowed to 
postpone the carbon costs settlement till the trade maturity. Thus, in case of a 
fluctuating market condition, emitters could profit from a possible declining 
carbon price level and save compliance costs. Overall, a well-developed 
derivative market could significantly reduce the risk associated with the carbon 
pricing.  
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3. Information contained in the electricity derivative contracts could reveal the 
market expectation of carbon price and its sensitivity to the policy 
implementation. As a reflection of market anticipation regarding the future 
electricity price level, electricity derivative contracts showed inconsistent price 
movement tendency under the influence of CPM implementation. While price 
level of short-term ETD derivative contracts exhibited an upward shift, the price 
trend of long-term electricity derivative was stable. Together with the calm 
evolution of implied volatility, theses phenomena implied that the CPM 
implementation caused market nervousness regarding the short-term electricity 
price. In contrast, it was expected that the effect of carbon pricing would be 
absorbed in the long-run.  
 
4. Despite the sensitivity to the various economic and political events, perception 
of policy uncertainty in the electricity derivative market did not strongly impact 
the stock price variability of electric utility companies. This finding sheds light 
on the portfolio construction and risk management. For instance, a portfolio 
including investment in electricity derivative market and electric company 
stocks would not experience volatility amplification due to the implementation 
of carbon pricing policy.  
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5. The CPM implementation also promoted the development of Australian 
electricity derivative market. The plan to impose carbon price induced 
speculations on the electricity derivative market, which inspired greater 
engagement of investors such as financial institutions. This consequently led to 
an improvement of liquidity and boom of market turnover, which further 
stimulated the diversification of product categories. Moreover, their expertise 
in investment and sophisticated trading strategy contributed to the risk 
management in the electricity sector. During the time of market expansion, a 
change of market preference also took place within the electricity derivative 
market. In comparison to the OTC derivative market, where trading parties 
bilaterally negotiate terms of transaction, the ETD market has experienced 
significant growth in market turnover due to its advantage in trading flexibility 
and higher market liquidity. 
5.4 Policy Implication  
In recent years, concerns over the environmental and economic impact from climate 
change have initiated establishment of mitigation policy framework nationally and 
internationally. This study also drew lessons from evaluation of Australian carbon 
pricing policy:  
1. Experience from CPM implementation contributes to the design of carbon 
pricing scheme. As the costs imposed by a regulation framework, price range of 
carbon emission is a major concern for emitters. Under a regulation with 
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variable carbon price, emitters have to bear the uncertainty regarding 
compliance costs during the price discovery process. Australian CPM 
significantly reduced such risk, as it was designed to start with a fixed price 
before switching to a variable one. According to the Clean Energy Act (2011), 
the CPM launched with a 23 AUD/tCO2-e in July 2012. The price grew annually 
before the planned switch to an ETS after three-year implementation. Because 
of the price level set by the legislative framework, the magnitudes of price 
increase in both electricity spot and derivative markets were limited. The fixed 
carbon price could further serve as initial price guidance before the transition to 
the ETS. 
 
2. A major issue throughout the implementation of Australian CPM was the policy 
uncertainty. Although the CPM was endorsed by the legislative framework, the 
weak public support due to concerns over the economic impact from policy 
implementation caused continuous controversies. The dynamics of implied 
carbon price reflected how political and economic incidents shook the market 
confidence on the continuation of carbon pricing policy. While the market 
proved its ability to anticipate and adjust expectation of future carbon price level, 
the variability of implied carbon price also revealed the influence of policy 
uncertainty on market sentiment. Pessimistic speculation began to accumulate 
prior to the termination of CPM as a result of doubt about the survival of policy.  
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3. Lessons from the Australian CPM implementation addressed the importance of 
policy certainty and persistence. The study showed that dispute on the climate 
change policy would lead to an ambiguous political commitment to the 
continuation of existing policy framework. This could significantly weaken its 
effect on constraining GHG emissions. Moreover, the uncertainty would induce 
policy speculations, which cause hesitation in adopting low-emitting 
technology and abatement investment. More importantly, abolishing the 
existing policy framework would remove the emission constraint on inefficient 
emitters. Once they restart to emit, it would become more difficult to restrain 
the total GHG emissions. Overall, policy uncertainty creates perplexity to the 
emitters and investors, which could potentially depress the market confidence. 
In order to avoid unnecessary policy uncertainty, policy maker should send clear 
message to the market during the policy design and implementation. 
Furthermore, besides curbing GHG emission, carbon pricing also intends to 
motivate a transition to a sustainable low carbon economy. Hence, a persistent 
policy development is necessary to ensure the long-term engagement in 
technology innovation and investment.    
The review of Australian CPM indicated that carbon pricing policy is still under 
pressure, despite the broad public awareness regarding the challenge from climate 
change and the development of policy engagement in the last decade. Repeal of CPM 
in Australia demonstrated that climate change policy can be vulnerable even if it was 
part of the legislative framework. An aftermath of the effect of carbon pricing policy 
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on electricity sector contributes to the policy evaluation as well as the future design and 
implementation of carbon pricing scheme. Climate change is not only threating the 
stability of earth environmental system, but also has been causing frequent weather 
hazards and severe economic consequences. The sustainable development of human 
society requires immediate and persistent policy engagement, which is crucial for the 
success of the combat against climate change.
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APPENDIX A  
BDS Test 
Besides the conventional linearity tests such as Tar-F Test, LR Test and Keenan Test 
(Gibson & Nur, 2011; Tsay, 1989), Brock, Dechert and Scheinkman (BDS) test is also 
favoured by economists for purpose of testing nonlinearity (Brock et al., 1991; Chu, 
2001; Hsieh, 1991). This parametric asymmetry test is designed based on the spatial 
correlation concept from the chaos theory (Broock et al., 1996), which was initially 
designed for testing independence and identical distribution (Brock et al., 1991). Its null 
hypothesis assumes that the data follow an independent identically distribution (I.I.D.). 
The acceptance of the alternative hypothesis indicates no linear dependency but the 
existence of nonlinearity (Belaire‐Franch & Contreras, 2002; Lin, 1997).   
The BDS test is completed in five steps with MATLAB according to the procedure 
developed by Kanzler (1999). After converting the time series data into first difference 
of natural logarithms (Equation (A1)), an embedding dimension value m will be 
selected, so that the time series could be transformed into m-dimensional overlapping 
successive vectors (Equation (A2)). 
     [Xi]=[X1, X2, X3, …, XN ]            (A1)  
      ܺேି௠௠ =( XN-m, XN-m+1, …, XN )            (A2)   
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By adding the pairs of points (i,j) among the m-dimensional space within a radius or 
tolerance ε, spatial correlation among points could be measured as the correlation 
integral in Equation (A3).31 
  Cε,m= 
, ;
1
( 1) i ji jm m
I
N N 

,  where  , ;
1
0
m n
i i
i j
x x
I
else

   

        (A3) 
The time series is I.I.D if Cε,m ≈ [Cε,1]m  (Brock & Sayers, 1988; Kuok KunChu, 2001). 
In this study, the embedding dimension m is set to 2, and spatial distance (ε/σ) is set to 
1.5.  
Table A1: Results of BDS Test Statistics (

 =1.5, m=2, n=sample size) 
NSW QLD VIC NSW QLD VIC
Lags n=1095 n=1066 n=1081 n=1000 Quantile n=571 n=501 n=389 n=500 Quantile
1 113.26 113.48 75.67 -2.53 0.50% 108.32 115.86 77.48 -2.61 0.50%
2 131.88 130.98 86.7 -2.33 1.00% 124.16 133.46 87.39 -2.37 1.00%
3 150.71 148.95 95.83 -2 2.50% 143.7 153.62 98.96 -2.01 2.50%
4 174.73 171.56 106.84 -1.69 5.00% 170.31 180.87 114.16 -1.71 5.00%
5 206.25 201.66 121.77 1.68 95.00% 206.44 218 134.14 1.74 95.00%
6 247.31 241.03 140.56 2.01 97.50% 255.79 267.95 160.44 2.1 97.50%
7 301.53 292.33 164.43 2.43 99.00% 323.27 335.79 195.52 2.5 99.00%
8 374.62 359.32 194.93 2.7 99.50% 415.12 427.88 242.04 2.8 99.50%
NSW QLD VIC NSW QLD VIC
Lags n=1116 n=1116 n=1116 n=1000 Quantile n=1116 n=1116 n=1116 n=1000 Quantile
1 57.37 114.8 58.29 -2.53 0.50% 88.22 74.74 74.05 -2.53 0.50%
2 59.45 124.15 60.59 -2.33 1.00% 94.03 78.43 77.38 -2.33 1.00%
3 61.84 135.49 63.23 -2 2.50% 100.86 82.9 81.44 -2 2.50%
4 65.71 151.59 67.4 -1.69 5.00% 110.58 89.7 87.57 -1.69 5.00%
5 71.11 173.49 73.21 1.68 95.00% 123.95 99.04 96.11 1.68 95.00%
6 78.19 202.53 80.82 2.01 97.50% 141.56 111.31 107.35 2.01 97.50%
7 87.13 240.33 90.46 2.43 99.00% 163.96 126.94 121.69 2.43 99.00%
8 98.21 289.25 102.46 2.7 99.50% 192.54 146.6 139.66 2.7 99.50%
Quarterly Futures Strip Futures Option 
OTC Strip Forward Curve OTC Quarterly Forward Curve
Critical Value
Critical Value
Critical Value
Critical Value
 
Source of critical value: Kanzler (1999) 
                                                            
31 In the context of time series, spatial correlation measures the correlation between pairs of points within 
a range of ε along the time horizon. 
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APPENDIX B  
VAR Model in Standard Form 
The matrix transformation converts the primitive VAR equation system to the reduced-
form equations (Enders, 2008). Using the matrix algebra, the VAR system could be 
rewritten as 
 10 112 11 12
20 121 21 22
1
1
t t yt
t t zt
y b yb
z b zb
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or  
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Premultiplication by 1B  , I obtain the VAR model in standard form  
 0 1 1t t tx A Ax e     (B2) 
, where   
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The error term te  is a composite of shocks of variables t . Since 1t te B  ,  
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 It is assumed that  
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, where  is the contemporaneous covariance matrix of errors as  
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APPENDIX C  
The Impulse Response Function 
The impulse response function of a VAR model is derived from its vector moving 
average (VMA) form. The methodology could trace out the time path of variable 
reaction in the VAR system to the exogenous shock. Consider the VAR model in matrix 
form, which expresses variables ty and tz in terms of the  1te  and  2te  sequences 
(Enders, 2008):     
 111 12
0 221 22
i
t t
it t
y ea ay
z ea az


           
      
  (C1) 
Since  1te  and  2te are composite of shocks of variables t  (Appendix B), the matrix 
could be rewritten as  
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, where the 2 2  matrix i  with the elements ( )jk i  is defined as 
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Hence, the VMA form of VAR model could be written in terms of t sequence: 
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or more compactly 
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Thus, the coefficient i  reflects the effect of yt  and zt shocks on the entire time paths 
of  ty  and  tz sequences. The four (0)jk  elements in the Equation (C4) are called the 
impulse response functions (Enders, 2008).  
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APPENDIX D  
Experiment Instruction 
This is an experiment in market decision making. You will be paid for your 
participation in cash at the end of the experiment. Different participants may earn 
different amounts. What you earn will depend on your decisions and the decisions of 
others. 
The experiment will take place through computer terminals at which you are seated. 
We will start with a detailed instruction audio. If you have any questions regarding the 
instructions, raise your hand at the conclusion of the audio and your question will be 
answered so everyone can hear. After playing the audio, you will receive a quiz, in 
order to test your understanding. Please follow experimenter's instruction. 
If any difficulties arise after the experiment has begun, raise your hand and a monitor 
will come and assist you privately. 
From now on, you will only interact with each other via computers. Please don't talk to 
other participants; otherwise you will not be paid for experiment. 
Today’s experiment is comprised of 4 separate rounds. Each round will last for 13 
periods. Each period will consist of an investment stage followed by a production stage 
with an exception of Period 1. Period 1 will only have a production stage.  In each round, 
you will be a producer in a market that is composed of 8 producers, and your earnings 
will be based on the profitability of your decisions.  
Production Stage 
You will choose a Production Level each period. Each Production Level will generate 
a certain Production Income and will need a certain number of Required Inputs. At the 
start of each round, all 8 producers will need the same number of Required Inputs for 
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the Production Level.  Producers will earn different Production Incomes for each 
Production Level. 
Each period, you may choose to produce at any level between 0 (at which you will 
produce nothing, earn no income and will require no inputs) and 10. The number of 
Required Inputs that are needed for each Production Level is visible on the right side 
of the production table.  Every Production Level requires some number of inputs.  If 
you do not hold sufficient amount of inputs for your chosen Production Level at the end 
of a period, you will be automatically charged the Input Price for each Insufficient Input.  
The current Input Price per insufficient (i.e. required but not held) input is displayed in 
the top left corner of the production screen, along with the total Expenses Due for the 
insufficient inputs at the currently selected Production Level. 
Your production options are on the left side of the screen. You may choose a Production 
Level at which to produce for the current period by clicking a “Select Level” button to 
the left of each level.  Your currently selected Production Level is always bolded and 
highlighted in yellow. Once you have made your final decision and are ready to move 
on, click the “Continue” button on the top right of the screen. The period will end when 
the time expires or when the last person has clicked the “Continue” button. 
Your Balance will be updated with your Production Income at the end of each period’s 
production stage. At the conclusion of each production stage, you will see a summary 
of your performance for the period. The Summary Screen displays your Held Inputs, 
Required Inputs, Insufficient Inputs, Input Price, Expenses Due, and Balance as of the 
end of the Period.   
Investment Stage 
Starting in Period 2, you may invest to reduce the number of Required Inputs needed for 
production.  An opportunity to invest will be presented to you prior to each period’s production 
stage. Each investment stage will last for 60 seconds. Any investment you make will take effect 
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in the current period, and will lower your Required Inputs for all of the remaining periods in 
the round.   
By investing once, the Required Inputs for each Production Level will be reduced by 10 percent.  
Investments are additive, meaning that if you make multiple investments, your originally 
Required Inputs will be reduced by the sum of the respective percent reduction levels.  For 
example, choosing two 10 percent investments would reduce the number of Required Inputs by 
20 percent, so if the initial number of Required Inputs is 10, this requirement would be 8 inputs 
after two investments. You can see your current production schedule on the left side of the 
screen during the investment stage. 
You will have the opportunity to invest before each production stage starting in Period 2, and 
may invest at most once per period. Each investment has a cost. The Investment Cost is 
deducted from your Balance when you click the “Invest” button. Investment options and costs 
will not change during today’s experiment. 
Input Prices 
For the first 5 periods of each Round, the Input Price for each Insufficient Input will be E$0.  
Starting in Period 6 of each round, you will be charged an Input Price of E$16 for each 
Insufficient Input.  The total Expenses Due in connection with the Insufficient Inputs will be 
denoted in the upper left area of your screen. For example, if you need 8 Required Inputs, your 
Expenses Due will be E$16 times 8, or E$144. 
Starting from Period 10 of each round, there is a chance that the Input Price could change from 
E$16 to E$0 in one of the remaining periods, namely periods 10, 11, 12 or 13. The occurrence 
of the change in these periods is based on a random draw process determined by computer. If 
the change occurs, you will be informed at the beginning of that period, and the Input Price 
will directly change to E$0 in that period. As the result of the change, the Input price will 
remain at E$0 in all subsequent periods until the end of the round. The likelihood that the Input 
Price will change to E$0 in any of the periods 10, 11, 12 and 13 is the same. A message 
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informing you of the probability of change will be displayed at the beginning of each of the 
periods 10, 11, 12 and 13. 
Summary 
You are a producer in a market composed of 8 producers. You may select a Production Level 
between 0 and 10 each period.  You will earn Production Income and submit Required Inputs 
in association with your chosen Production Level. From Period 6 onwards, you will be charged 
E$16 for each Insufficient Input. You may choose to make investments that will reduce your 
Required Inputs (at most one investment per period).  Starting with Period 10, there is a chance 
that the Input Price could change to E$0 in one of the remaining periods. 
At all times during the Investment and Production stages, you may access a calculator by 
clicking the icon in the bottom right corner of your screen. 
At the conclusion of each production stage, you will see a summary of your performance for 
the period. The Summary Screen displays your Held Inputs, Required Inputs, Insufficient Inputs, 
Input Price, Expenses Due and Balance as of the end of the period. The Summary Screen also 
displays the total number of investments that the 8 Producers in the market have completed as 
of the current period. 
At the end of each round your remaining Balance will be converted into cash. The rate of 
experimental dollars to Australian dollars at which you will be paid is displayed on your screen.  
At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to fill out a short questionnaire.  
Your earnings from all four rounds will be added and paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. Please follow the instruction of experimenter for payment. 
Please return instruction, instruction quiz and consent form to experimenter when you collect 
your payment after experiment. Please don't take any experiment material out of the lab. 
Thank you for your attention. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
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APPENDIX E 
Instructions Quiz 
This quiz is designed to ensure your understanding of the experiment instructions.  
Please read and answer each question carefully. 
Question 1)  
Once in the production stage, how can you reduce the number of inputs that will be due 
at the end of the period?  
A. Sell inputs          B. Buy 
inputs   
C. Reduce your selected Production Level    D. Invest  
 
Question 2)  
If you change your Production Level, when will that change take effect?  
Please choose the best response.  
A. Immediately          B. 
Last Period  
C. Next Period  
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Question 3)  
How many Inputs will be required for a Production Level that was initially 10 inputs, 
following two 10% investments?  
A. 10            B. 9  
C. 8.1            D. 
8  
 
Question 4)  
In Period 1, what is the price per Input that you use?  
A. $0            B. 
$16  
C. $32  
 
Question 5)  
In Period 7, what is the Price per Input that you use? 
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A. $16           B. 
$5 
C. $32           D. 
$0  
 
Question 6)  
For how many periods will each Round last?  
A. 2            B. 3  
C. 13            D. 
10  
END OF THE QUIZ 
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Quiz Answer 
Question 1) C 
You may reduce the required inputs number investing in the investment stage. Once in 
the production stage, you can only reduce the number of inputs for the period by 
reducing your Production Level selection  
Question 2) A 
By clicking the Select Level button, you change the Production Level for the current 
Period.   
Your Balance will be credited with the income earned, and debited the costs due, in 
association with the selected Production Level at the end of the Production Phase. 
Question 3) D 
Each Investment reduces the original input requirements.   
So, these investments will reduce the permit requirement by 20% of 10, or 2 Inputs.   
The inputs required after 2 investments will be 10 - 2 = 8 Inputs. 
Question 4)   A 
In Periods 1-5, the Price per Input used is $0. 
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Question 5) A 
From Period 6, you will be charged E$16 for each Input that you use. 
From Period 10, there exists a chance that the Input Price could turn to E$0 and remains 
until the end of the round (13th Period). If this happens, you will be informed at the 
beginning of the Period. 
Question 6) C 
Each round will last for 13 periods. The experiment has 4 rounds in total. 
After each round, you will wait other participants to finish before a new round starts. 
 
 
 
